What Obama's nominees might mean for Latin America

Just the Facts

By Adam Isacson/

Once Congress gives the green light, the national security team for Barack Obama’s second term will have three new names at the top: John Kerry at State, Chuck Hagel at Defense, and John Brennan at CIA.

Kerry and Hagel are both Vietnam veterans turned Senators, both supportive of a strong, modern military but skeptical of large, open-ended military missions, sort of in the Colin Powell mode. Brennan is a career spy whose focus since the 1990s has been counterterrorism.

Only Kerry has much of a record on Latin America. In the 1980s, he was a leading opponent of the Reagan administration’s aid to abusive militaries, and to the Nicaraguan contra rebels, in Central America. He has also been a frequent critic of U.S. policy toward Cuba. In 2000, Senator Kerry shifted gears and supported a military aid package, President Clinton’s initial appropriation for Plan Colombia, though he later signed at least one letter criticizing Colombia’s human rights performance.

As David Sanger notes in today’s New York Times, all three nominees share a preference for a “light footprint” in the U.S. military’s activities abroad. Brennan, Sanger notes,

devised the “light footprint” strategy of limiting American interventions, whenever possible, to drones, cyberattacks and Special Operations forces. All are advocates of those low-cost, low-American-casualty tools, and all have sounded dismissive of attempts to send thousands of troops to rewire foreign nations as wasteful and ill-conceived.

With the notable exception of the 2009 Afghan “surge,” frequent but low-profile military and intelligence operations have been a hallmark of the Obama administration so far. With the ongoing drawdown from Afghanistan ahead of a planned 2014 pullout, the “light footprint” approach is going to accelerate.

How will this affect Latin America? Probably four ways, in declining order of importance:

• More Special Forces deployments to the region. President Obama and his new appointees share a fondness for Special Operations Forces: elite, highly trained, mobile military units used for non-traditional, often clandestine missions ranging from hostage rescues to hunting down wanted individuals to intelligence-gathering and “defense diplomacy.” Special Forces are likely to see their numbers increase despite upcoming defense budget cuts, and as the Afghanistan drawdown proceeds, there will be even more of them available to carry out missions in Latin America. Last year, the New York Times noted, Adm. William McRaven of the Special Operations Command was “pushing hard” to “expand their presence in regions where they have not operated in large numbers for the past decade, especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America.”

This doesn’t necessarily mean that Delta Force, SEAL Team 6, and other JSOC units will be carrying out clandestine mayhem in places like Venezuela and Cuba. (And if it does, we’re unlikely to find out about it.) But a recent conversation with a Defense Department official confirms that, in the next few years, we are likely to witness an increase in Special Forces training missions in the region. More teams will be in countries throughout the Americas teaching courses as part of Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), and organizing exercises, some of them through the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program.

Such deployments fulfill more than just training missions, though. They allow Special Forces units to familiarize themselves with the terrain, culture, and key officers in countries where they might someday have to operate. And they allow U.S. personnel to gather intelligence on their host countries, whether through active snooping or passive observation.

• A greater intelligence community presence is another likely consequence of a “light footprint” in Latin America. We can only speculate, but it is reasonable to expect fewer CIA assets in Afghanistan to mean more personnel focused elsewhere, including Latin America. Even more significant may be an increase in the presence of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Defense Department’s spy agency. As the Washington Post reported in December, the DIA expects to roughly double the number of clandestine operatives it deploys worldwide over the next few years.
  
• Greater use of drones and robotics. The Obama administration has expanded the CIA and Defense Department use of armed unmanned aircraft to hunt down suspected terrorist targets. Brennan, the new CIA director, is known for being intimately involved this practice, which is extremely controversial because of reports that the drone program may have killed hundreds of innocent people in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere.
  

In Latin America, a few U.S. defense officials have confirmed to us recently, the U.S. military is not using weaponized drones, though it is employing some surveillance drones to detect suspect trafficking activity, particularly (but not only) above international waters. All officials have insisted that U.S. drones are not used extensively in the region, as they are costly to operate. However, as assets are drawn down from Afghanistan and as costs continue to drop rapidly, it is reasonable to expect the Obama administration to use them more frequently in the Americas.

The U.S. effort, however, may pale in comparison to Latin American countries’ own drone programs. Several countries — Colombia, Venezuela, and especially Brazil — are developing their own programs, and several more are buying drones, especially from Israel. While none of these drones are reportedly weaponized and there have been no reports of unauthorized cross-border drone flights, the increased affordability of drones, and the lack of norms governing their use, promises to pose a big challenge for Latin America within the next 5-10 years. (We will have a post on this topic shortly.)

• More emphasis on cyber-security. As today’s New York Times piece noted, cyber-warfare is an interest of all three of the Obama administration’s nominees. While it is unclear how this will play out in U.S. national security policy toward the Americas, it is reasonable to expect more resources devoted to cracking open, and even sabotaging, the computer networks of countries or organizations that the U.S. government views as a threat. (For more on cyber-security in the hemisphere, see the work of James Bosworth at Bloggings by Boz.)

Iran and Hezbollah in Latin America

crethiplethi.com

Just the Facts/ By Sarah Kinosian

On November 15, the House Homeland Security Committee's Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations and Management released a report that examines "the increased presence and influence of Iran and Hezbollah in Latin America and their relationship with drug cartels." It also looks at the turf wars between Mexican drug cartels and the threat they pose to the Southwest border.

The 50-page document, titled “A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest Border,” determines that "While Latin American bases serve as a finance mechanism for Hezbollah, it is believed the ability exists to turn operational if the need arises. There is no doubt that the enemy is at our doorstep and we must do something about it now."

While cited evidence from congressional reports, experts and news articles supports some of the report's findings regarding increasing Iranian presence in the region, the subcommittee's broader claims about established links between Mexican drug cartels and Hezbollah/Iran posing an imminent threat are largely unsubstantiated.

Several previous government statements and investigations on transnational crime take note of Iran and Hezbollah's engagement in the region, indicating it is something officials are aware of and monitoring, but show no solid transnational links between the groups or an immediate threat to homeland security.

"A Line in the Sand" details Iranian political and economic involvement in Venezuela and other Latin American countries, funding sources for Hezbollah in the region, incidences of criminal links between Hezbollah-supporting individuals and/or Colombian and Mexican drug trafficking organizations, and a failed 2011 Iranian assassination attempt on the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S.

With regards to Iran, much of the report relays what several other government sources and analysts have found:

• Hezbollah receives funding from individuals, primarily within the large Lebanese population in the region and especially those in the tri-border area between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina, who support the group, providing a large portion of its extra-state financing.
  • Of note on this matter is that according to the State Department, this has been occurring since the mid 1980s. However, Iran is Hezbollah’s primary funding source, donating at least $200 million in 2008, with income from criminal enterprises in general only representing a sliver of the group's financing.
• Individuals who support Hezbollah are involved with criminal networks and illicit activities.
  • An important note to this point is that while the cases of individuals arrested for drug trafficking and human smuggling highlighted in the report were linked to Hezbollah, the document did not identify any of them as actual members of the group.
• Iran has increased its cultural and political presence in the hemisphere and now has 11 embassies in the region.
• Iran has been able to circumvent sanctions because of its economic partnership with a few countries in the region, most notably Venezuela. It is either economically involved or looking to become economically involved with several countries in Latin America.
• Iran has strengthened ties with Venezuela, with which it is ideologically aligned. According to testimony from analyst Douglas Farah, a 2011 Univision documentary showed Hezbollah training Venezuelan troops.
  • A testimony from Ambassador Roger Noriega, visiting fellow from the American Enterprise Institute, claims Hezbollah cells and Sinaloa cartel members are operating together in Venezuela, but cites unnamed sources and fails to footnote this part of the testimony.
• In 2011 Iran attempted to hire an alleged member of the Mexican Zeta cartel to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States in Washington D.C. for a fee of $1.5 million. The Zeta operative turned out to be a DEA informant and the plot was foiled.

Aside from more detailed expansion on these points, the report in many cases uses these findings t make overreaching conclusions are often not sourced, cite the same subcommittee's previous report or cite individual's previous testimonies with unchecked sources.

In his opening statement to present the report, subcommittee Chairman Michael McCaul sets the stage for the report, claiming "Iran’s strategic migration and its relationships in Latin America are a clear and present danger to American national security" and that it "is also attempting to lay the foundation for military and covert operations within the U.S. by partnering with Mexican drug cartels."

Nowhere in the report are either of these statements corroborated. As security analyst Steven Dudley from Insight Crime and Samuel Logan from Southern Pulse both contend, Mexican criminal groups are not likely to commit acts of political violence in the U.S., much less involve foreign governments.

The document goes on to state, “Iran and Hezbollah have been involved in the underworld of Latin America long enough to become intimately familiar with all of its inhabitants and capitalize on their capabilities.”*

It substantiates this claim with a testimony from former DEA executive Michael Braun, who says, "If you want to visualize ungoverned space or a permissive environment, I tell people to simply think of the bar scene in the first Star Wars movie. Operatives from FTOs (foreign terrorist organizations) and DTOs (drug trafficking organizations) are frequenting the same shady bars, the same seedy hotels and the same sweaty brothels in a growing number of areas around the world. Based upon over 37 years in the law enforcement and security sectors, you can mark my word that they are most assuredly talking business and sharing lessons learned."

According to the report, the 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador was the result of these links established in "shady bars." The incident is the strongest established connection between Iran and Mexican drug cartels that the report examines.

While the plot was real and revealed developments to which policymakers should pay attention, many analysts and major media were skeptical of the details and whether the incident truly denotes Iranian-Zeta links. As Adam Isacson pointed out on border fact check blog, there was no evidence that the Zeta organization knew about the plan.

Insight Crime looked at the details of the case and concluded the failed plot served to show the lack of intimate contact and knowledge between Iran and the Mexican cartels, which many analysts have said are "not interested in committing acts of political violence on U.S. soil." Analyst James Bosworth also examines the case on his blog, saying "the clearly amateurish nature of Iran's involvement here shows that we have less to fear. The fact that an Iranian Qods-linked official is poking around the border looking for Zetas sicarios and ends up with the DEA informant suggests that Iran and Hezbollah have far less ties to the Mexican organized crime scene than some analysts would want you to believe."

In the "2012 Terrorism and Transnational Crime Report," Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper said "It remains to be seen whether this alleged plot is indicative of greater crime-terrorism cooperation or a one-time departure from conventional IRGC-QF tactics." He did however note that the plot indicates some Iranian officials are more willing to conduct an attack in the U.S., but said nothing about established links to Mexican cartels.

Other government reports and statements acknowledge Iran and Hezbollah's presence as a potential threat, but not as an imminent danger. Similarly none of the security reports note any direct transnational connection between terrorist organizations and Mexican drug cartels, or highlight Iran's involvement in Venezuela as a threat to national security.

In the "World Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community" Clapper acknowledges the potential for links, but admits that the extent of connection between the groups is unclear. There is no discussion of Venezuelan-Iranian ties as a threat.

The State Department's 2010 "Country Report on Terrorism," published in August 2011, denied the existence of transnational terrorist groups actively operating in the country, saying, "There were no known operational cells of either al-Qaida- or Hezbollah-related groups in the hemisphere."

Similarly, the 2011 "Country Report on Terrorism" indicates no threat of a transnational terrorist attack in the Western Hemisphere and discovered "No known international terrorist organization had an operational presence in Mexico and no terrorist group targeted U.S. citizens in or from Mexican territory." It found "no evidence of signs of ties between Mexican criminal organizations and terrorist groups."

The findings from the House's Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012, passed by the body in September, follows the general trend of government statements by recognizing Hezbollah presence, funding sources and some involvement in illegal activity, but states no known operational links between Hezbollah and Mexican drug cartels, other than the assassination plot and a money laundering scheme between the Zetas and Lebanese Canadian bank, which has since been shut down.

"A Line in the Sand" also concludes that "the FARC is operating with Iran and Hezbollah in Venezuela, and the Venezuelan Government is complicit in these operations." For this reason, the subcommittee gives the recommendation that "the U.S. government should consider designating Venezuela a state sponsor of terrorism."

In an interview with Polifact, Vanda Felbab-Brown of the Brookings Institution, who testified in 2009 for the House subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs on illicit economies, organized crime, and their impact on U.S. and global security, said, "Allegations of al-Qaida, Hamas, and Hezbollah contacts with the FARC or these groups' penetration of the Latin American drug trade have not proven robust."

Kevin Casas-Zamora, former vice president of Costa Rica, added, "If Venezuela was indeed harboring a serious Hezbollah operation we would surely know it by now. The U.S. has had for years an official policy of toning down the confrontation with Chavez, but a serious terrorist threat is the one thing that the U.S. would not countenance."

When asked directly about Iran's involvement in the hemisphere during testimony to the Senate in March, former Southern Command leader General Doug Fraser highlighted the continued financial support the organizations receive from the region, saying, “Our concern remains their traditional connections with Hezbollah and Hamas, who do have organizations in Latin America. Those organizations are primarily focused on financial support to organizations back in the Middle East, but they are involved in illicit activity."

As far as the threat of these groups to U.S. security, he did comment on the connection between these groups and illicit activities in the region and said it is something SOUTHCOM will "continue to look for as we watch in the future, that connection between the illicit activity and the potential pathway into the United States," echoing the watchful caution presented in SOUTHCOM's 2012 posture statement.

Towards the end of the section on Iran, “A Line in the Sand” says "it is believed the ability exists to turn operational if the need arises. There is no doubt that the enemy is at our doorstep and we must do something about it now.”

The 2010 "International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress," along with other government reports, supports this statement to a degree, noting the potential of Hezbollah supporters in the region to become more involved. It says, “If the organization decided to attack U.S. or Israeli interests in West Africa or South America, it is possible that these sympathizers could play a concrete role.” However no reports give the sense that "the enemy is at our doorstep."

The United States government, along with several security experts, has conducted many investigations into this issue. The overall conclusion seems to be that while the threat of Hezbollah in the hemisphere is there, it is relatively small and something that is being monitored.

-------------------

Also Iranian and Hezbollah Involvement in Criminal Activities in Latin America >>

Canciller cubano: "La CELAC es nuestra obra más preciada,..."

Destituido por el Congreso el Presidente paraguayo Fernando Lugo

democracia constitutucional en accion. duro golpe para los albistas e idiotas izquierdosos  latinoamericanos 

------------------------------------- 

Abandonado el palacio de gobierno

By Daniela Desantis

ASUNCION — Ousted Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo said on Friday he accepted Congress' decision to remove him from office after a lightning-quick impeachment trial.

Lugo, a former Roman Catholic bishop who was due to finish his term next year, urged supporters angered by his ouster to protest peacefully. In a television address, he said he already considered himself a "former president."

Lugo, a silver-haired former Roman Catholic bishop who quit the Church to run for the presidency, was found guilty of mishandling armed clashes over a land eviction in which 17 police and peasant farmers were killed last week.

In line with Paraguay's constitution, Lugo will be replaced by Vice President Federico Franco, who has been a fierce opponent of the president.

Lugo's rivals firmly control both congressional houses. The Senate voted 39-4 to remove him the day after Lawmakers in the lower house agreed in a sudden, near-unanimous vote to impeach him.

Several thousand Lugo supporters gathered outside Congress in the capital, Asuncion, and tried to break through police lines as the verdict was given. Police fired teargas and rubber bullets to disperse the crowd.

"This is an 'express' coup because (lawmakers) have done it in the wee hours of the night," Lugo told television station Telesur late on Thursday.

Lugo had refused to resign, resisting pressure from Church leaders to step down to ease mounting tension in the soy-exporting nation of 6 million people, one of the poorest and least stable in South America.

The next presidential election is in 2013 and Franco had been expected to run for office.

It was not clear whether Franco would be able to run next year if he assumes the presidency now because the constitution limits leaders to a single term.

Re-election has been banned since the constitution was overhauled following the 1989 fall of General Alfredo Stroessner's brutal 35-year dictatorship.

Lugo, 61, a mild-mannered leftist who speaks the Guarani Indian language, vowed to champion the needs of poor Paraguayans when he was elected four years ago, ending six decades of rule by the Colorado party.

The quickness of the impeachment trial raised concern among South American governments, which dispatched their foreign ministers to Asuncion late on Thursday. So me warned of possible sanctions if Lugo was ousted.

Senator Rubio Addresses the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials Annual Conference 2012

SenatorMarcoRubio

Cuba y América Latina

www.cubanet.org/ Mario J. Viera

Yo era muy joven cuando soñaba con una América Latina unida en una poderosa federación que sirviera de contrapeso natural a la poderosa federación del norte. Era la época de las dictaduras de Batista, Trujillo, Stroessner, Somoza, Pérez Jiménez, Duvalier y del momento álgido de la Guerra Fría. Estados Unidos respondiendo a los intereses de la realpolitik y a su seguridad nacional apoyaba a aquellos regímenes como contén al avance del comunismo. En Cuba crecía el movimiento insurreccional en contra del régimen de Batista, Venezuela se convertía en una esperanza con el derrocamiento del gobierno de Marcos Pérez Jiménez.

jornada.unam.mx/  Salinas de Gortari con Fidel 

en la Cumbre de Guadalajara [1991]

Se avistaban tiempos de cambios… La Revolución cubana sería un sueño frustrado en los paredones de fusilamiento; Cuba se sometía a los dictados del imperio soviético. América Latina rompería sus vínculos con el gobierno de Castro y Castro replicaría con la Tricontinental (OSPAAAL) y la formación de focos guerrilleros en numerosos países latinoamericanos.

La táctica de los focos guerrilleros funcionó a favor del gobierno castrista. Muchos gobiernos de la región decidieron comprarse ─ con el restablecimiento de relaciones con el gobierno de Cuba ─ una “póliza de seguros” contra riesgos de actividad guerrillera, como Argentina en 1973 bajo el gobierno de Perón. El México del PRI no solo votó en contra de la expulsión del gobierno castrista de la OEA, sino que fortaleció sus vínculos diplomáticos con la isla. Regímenes de izquierda que surgieron en el subcontinente iniciaron relaciones diplomáticas con el castrismo. En 1970 el gobierno de Salvador Allende restablece las relaciones diplomáticas con el de Cuba; Perú bajo el régimen de Juan Velazco Alvarado lo hace en 1972. A esta troika comenzaron a unirse el resto de los países latinoamericanos. Brasil en 1986 bajo el gobierno de José Sarney reinicia las relaciones con el régimen cubano, más por intereses comerciales que por razones ideológicas. En 1975, Alfonso López Michelsen, presidente de Colombia, restablece las relaciones diplomáticas con el castrismo, aunque en 1981, Turbay Ayala interrumpe esas relaciones debido al incidente de la toma de la Embajada de la República Dominicana por terroristas del M-19 que eran sustentados por el gobierno de Fidel Castro; estas relaciones no se restablecieron hasta después de un encuentro privado entre Fidel Castro y César Gaviria y a la conclusión de la Cumbre Iberoamericana de Guadalajara en 1991.

Salvo alguna tímida crítica al régimen castrista por algún que otro gobierno latinoamericano, todo fue una larga luna de miel con la dictadura cubana. El sentimiento antinorteamericano que prevalece en prácticamente en toda la América Latina fortaleció los lazos de colaboración de los gobiernos latinoamericanos con el gobierno de Fidel Castro. La gran mayoría de esos gobiernos votaban siempre a favor del castrismo en la Comisión de Derechos Humanos o se abstenían cuando se le enjuiciaba por las violaciones a esos derechos y condenaban como criminal el embargo comercial de Estados Unidos al régimen totalitario de Cuba.

Con la llegada al poder de Hugo Chávez en Venezuela se inició un nuevo planteamiento de las relaciones diplomáticas latinoamericanas hacia el régimen de los Castro que se fortaleció con la creación de la Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA) en la que Fidel Castro jugó, junto a Chávez, un papel de primera línea, al igual que en la fundación de Telesur como vocero del socialismo del siglo XXI.

Tras la aprobación en 2009 del reingreso del gobierno castrista a la Organización de Estados Americanos surgió una ola de solidaridad latinoamericana a favor del régimen de los Castro. La Cuba castrista recibió el respaldo continental con Venezuela y Brasil a la cabeza. Muchos de los presidentes elegidos democráticamente no dudaron en visitar la isla y peregrinar hasta el santuario de la Zona Cero donde reside el anciano Castro y hacerse fotografiar muy sonrientes con el decrépito tirano caribeño, sin prestar oído a las denuncias de la oposición cubana sobre los actos de repudio y represión y la muerte de Orlando Zapata en medio de una huelga de hambre.

El castrismo ha recibido tribuna en organismos regionales como, además de su puesto en ALBA, en el CELAC (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños), el Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe (SELA), la Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI) ─ junto a Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, México, Nicaragua, Panamá, Paraguay, Perú, Uruguay, Venezuela ─, la Asociación de Estados del Caribe ─ junto a Antigua y Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belice, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, El Salvador, Granada, Guatemala, Guatemala, Haití, Honduras, Jamaica, México, Nicaragua, Panamá, República Dominicana, San Cristóbal y Nieves, Santa Lucía, San Vicente y las Granadinas, Surinam, Trinidad y Tobago, Venezuela.

El último acto de respaldo al régimen castrista fue la propuesta lanzada por Rafael Correa de admitir a Raúl Castro como si fuera un presidente electo democráticamente a la Cumbre de las Américas y que ha recibido el apoyo de la gran mayoría de los gobiernos latinoamericanos.

A diferencia de los gobiernos latinoamericanos, los gobiernos de Europa que también mantiene relaciones diplomáticas con los usurpadores del poder en Cuba, han sido persistentes en condenar al castrismo en la Comisión de Derechos Humanos y mantenido unas tímidas sanciones de carácter moral en contra del régimen. No obstante, Europa sostiene relaciones comerciales con los Castro, ha condenado el embargo económico de Estados Unidos y le conceden el trato de gobernantes legítimos.

Ante de la celebración de la Cumbre de las Américas se produjo la vergonzosa visita del presidente mexicano Felipe Calderón a Cuba. Con esta visita, como afirmara el  candidato a doctor en filosofía en la Escuela de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de Denver, Arturo López Levy, “ambos países buscaran resolver los problemas de la deuda cubana y el  acceso cubano a créditos frescos a cambio de oportunidades a grupos empresariales mexicanos interesados en aprovechar las aperturas que tienen lugar en la isla. Permitir la participación de PEMEX en la explotación conjunta de los recursos petroleros cubanos es una vía apropiada, no la única, para esos propósitos”. Son los intereses mexicanos puestos al servicio de la continuidad del régimen usurpador.

López Levi señala además: “A diferencia de Fox y Castañeda, renegado de posiciones juveniles de izquierda, el actual inquilino de Los Pinos no ha considerado un deber de identidad exhibir simpatías por los opositores cubanos que se deducen de su trayectoria e ideología”.

Para Calderón la oposición cubana no existe; él declararía que “México y Cuba (entiéndase los Castro) han emprendido una renovada etapa en su relación bilateral” y no conforme con ello afirmó que en lo personal condena y seguirá condenando “el bloqueo injustificado”, como coincidente con el castrismo calificara al embargo de Estados Unidos en contra del gobierno totalitario de la isla; además le expresó a los periodistas que cubrieron su llegada a la isla: “Queremos ampliar el comercio y la inversión entre Cuba y México”.

El régimen castrista agoniza ya dio de sí todo lo que pudo dar; su fin se producirá ineludiblemente bajo acciones endógenas y se desplomará como un edificio viejo y agrietado que cae por su propio peso. Aquellos que se han dado a la caza de oportunidades aprovechando la crisis del castrismo serán los grandes perdedores. La República renacida de entre sus cenizas no aceptará como suyos las deudas y compromisos contraídos por los usurpadores. Será entonces el momento del recuento. Cuba nada tendrá que agradecerle a la América Latina, no volveremos a reconocernos como naciones hermanas; Abel no puede abrazar a Caín.

Tal vez, un día pudiéramos rencontrarnos pero solo cuando todo el subcontinente le ofrezca excusas a los cubanos por haberles abandonado coqueteando con sus tiranos.

Hoy en mis años maduros he abandonado muchas de las ilusiones pueriles de mis años mozos, una de ellas la Federación de Estados Latinoamericanos.

Obama's Hooker Orgy Story in Cartagena: A Convenient Distraction

Published on Apr 17, 2012 by TheAlexJonesChannel

You get what you pay for: Cuba issue deals blow to US stature at ’Summit of the Americas’

Enrique Marcarian / Reuters

President Barack Obama and other leaders from Latin America and the Caribbean pose at the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia, on Sunday.

By msnbc.com and news services

CARTAGENA, Colombia -- Unprecedented Latin American opposition to U.S. sanctions on communist Cuba left President Barack Obama isolated at the Summit of the Americas on Sunday and illustrated Washington's waning influence in the region.

In contrast to the rock-star status he enjoyed at the 2009 summit in Trinidad and Tobago shortly after taking office, Obama has had a bruising time at the two-day meeting in Colombia of some 30 heads of state from across the Americas. 

Eleven Secret Service agents and five military personnel were caught in an embarrassing prostitution scandal, Brazil and others have bashed Obama over U.S. monetary policy, and he has been on the defensive over calls to legalize drugs. Thanks to the U.S. and Canadian line on Cuba, the heads of state were unable to produce a final declaration as the summit fizzled out on Sunday.

"There was no declaration because there was no consensus," said Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, who hosted the summit.

"That is not a failure, on the contrary," he said, trying to spin the outcome and frank exchange of different views as a sign of strength.

At a press conference with Santos, Obama responded to a question about Cuba by saying that while his administration has eased travel by Cuban Americans to Cuba, the Cuban government had not taken steps toward democracy and "has not yet observed basic human rights."   More >>

Presidente Santos: "...es inaceptable una próxima Cumbre sin Cuba"

La dignidad en las Cumbres de las Americas: Cuando Francisco Flores confronto a Fidel Castro

The KGB in America-The Cuba connection: History and Operations [Documentary]

Uploaded by nologorecords

Pudor Neokaxtrizta: Volveremos!!!

Editorial de El Nacional de Venezuela/

El Gobierno de Cuba intenta asistir a la Cumbre de las Américas que se celebrará en abril en Cartagena de Indias, pero no se ha atrevido a pedir ser invitado pues resultaría extraño solicitarlo después de haber insultado durante años a los países participantes tildándolos de lacayos del imperio

Con un pudor de señorita, el Gobierno de Cuba intenta asistir a la Cumbre de las Américas que se celebrará en abril en Cartagena de Indias. No se ha atrevido a pedir ser invitado porque resultaría extraño solicitarlo después de haber insultado durante años a los países participantes tildándolos de lacayos del imperio.

Decirlo abiertamente daría la impresión ante el pueblo cubano y la opinión pública mundial de que ahora la revolución también desea ser lacaya de Estados Unidos. Lo que después de varias décadas de haber servido de instrumento del imperio soviético la dejaría en una posición poco honorable.

Pero en una maniobra diplomática que lleva un indeleble sello habanero ha logrado que los acólitos con que cuenta en el hemisferio hagan la solicitud para que sea invitado. Rafael Correa, presidente del Ecuador, ha sido el vocero y ha propuesto que los socios del Alba se abstengan de asistir a la cumbre si en ella no está presente el Gobierno de Cuba.

Esta amenaza deja asomar la piel de lobo detrás de la apariencia de cordero que el menor de los hermanos Castro intenta adoptar de vez en cuando. El canciller cubano, Bruno Rodríguez, después de reunirse con sus pares del Alba, declara suavemente que su presidente asistiría si lo invitan y que excluir "de manera deliberada e injusta" a su país de la reunión de los lacayos le restaría a la cita carácter hemisférico. Pero precisa que no se reincorporará a la OEA para poder hacerlo.

En consecuencia, los socios del Alba le han solicitado al país anfitrión que invite al Gobierno de Cuba, sin insistir en su amenaza de boicot. Como difícilmente Colombia pueda hacerlo sin el consenso de todos los participantes, y ya Estados Unidos ha expresado que sólo deben estar presentes los países miembros de la OEA, de esta manera el Gobierno de Cuba aparece nuevamente como víctima, posición que le encanta, y abre el camino para que su futura reincorporación en el grupo de "lacayos del imperio" sea considerada, en su oportunidad, como una victoria de la revolución.

Por otra parte, la maniobra permite que Chávez y Correa enciendan su verbo antiimperialista durante un año en que deben enfrentar elecciones reñidas. El hijo pródigo quiere volver poniendo condiciones. Pero le sucede como a esos ateos moribundos que en los momentos postreros se acuerdan de todos los santos y elevan oraciones en voz baja.

El pudor del Gobierno cubano de no pedir directamente ser invitado al foro hemisférico responde, por una parte, al temor de que algunos de los agraviados recuerden que se les dijo que eran indignos por servir de comparsa de los "propósitos de dominación, ocupación y agresión de Estados Unidos" y, por otra parte, que el pueblo cubano constate que lo de "Patria o muerte" era sólo una consigna y que a la hora de la verdad los hermanos Castro en vez de repetir "¡Venceremos!" están suplicando "¡Volveremos!".

Oppenheimer: "Obama should take the offensive on Cuba"

By Andres Oppenheimer

BOGOTA, Colombia -- miamiherald.com/andres_oppenheimer/

The U.S. State Department wasn’t terribly smart when it rejected a demand by Latin American populist leaders that Cuba be invited to an April 14 summit of President Barack Obama with 33 hemispheric leaders in Colombia. It should have accepted the petition, and used it to grill Cuba’s military dictatorship in front of a world audience.
The diplomatic ruckus started at a meeting of leftist presidents in Venezuela earlier this month, when Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa proposed that members of the Venezuelan-led ALBA bloc boycott the 5th Summit of the Americas to be held in Cartagena, Colombia, unless Cuba — the only country in the hemisphere excluded from the meeting — was allowed to participate. Venezuela and other countries immediately approved the motion.
U.S. officials responded — sticking to their policy guidelines — that Cuba cannot be invited because under the summit’s rules only democratically elected leaders who are committed to the 34-country Organization of American States’ rules can attend.
Colombia — the host country, which is trying to avoid defections that would mar the summit — sent Foreign Minister Maria Angela Holguin to Havana to try to solve the problem, but she came back empty-handed. She told reporters after the visit that Cuba indeed wants to attend the summit.
The diplomatic impasse is making big headlines in the region. During a visit here, almost everybody I talked to referred to the issue. Not surprisingly, the prevailing narrative in the Colombian press is that the United States is once again punishing a small and proud Caribbean island for its independent foreign policy — the old David vs. Goliath tale, which Cuba has played so often over the years.
So what should Washington do? Instead of rejecting Cuba’s presence, the State Department should have put out a statement saying that Cuban ruler Gen. Raúl Castro is more than welcome to attend the summit as an outside guest to answer several questions, starting with for how long Cuba plans to remain the last military dictatorship in the Western Hemisphere.
More specifically, and given diplomats’ penchant for legal formalities, Gen. Castro should be asked:

Read more here: http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/02/15/2643434/obama-should-take-the-offensive.html#storylink=cpy

Cumbre de las Americas: Despejada la crisis artifical creada por los subditos de Kaxtro

Con la prepotencia y ambivalencia de siempre, segun un despacho de EFE que cita a Bruno Rodriquez >>

The Summit of the Americas: What “The Sun” shines on Cuba

By John Paul Rathbone/

February is the month of balmy summer days in Latin America, although the season of beach holidays hasn’t stopped a delicious diplomatic storm from brewing.

At the heart of the thundery electrostatic is the perennial problem. Will Cuba attend the “Summit of the Americas” this April?

This is more than recondite politics. It is drama. If Cuba does attend, then the world will enjoy the unique spectacle of a US President sharing the same podium as one of the Castro brothers.

If it doesn’t, well that would be because Cuba again does not meet the democratic requirements of the Organisation of American States.

The stakes – if you can call them that – are growing.

Ecuador – junior member of the Venezuela and Cuba- sponsored regional grouping, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (or ALBA, which recently brought the world these words of support and respect for the Bashar Al-Assad regime in Syria) – has said Cuba should be allowed to attend. Furthermore, if Cuba isn’t invited, then ALBA should boycott the Summit, where 34 heads of state are otherwise supposed to attend.

That would hold out the prospect of a similar fiasco to the 2005 Summit, when a protest rally, partly organised by the Argentine hosts, saw Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez round on a trade deal that was subsequently approved by 29 other countries.

This time round, a similar boycott would produce collateral damage for the Summit’s hardworking but embarrassed Colombian hosts. More importantly, it would be a snub for the US. Why?

Because the OAS is the sole regional forum where the US still has a voice, and a walkout by Ecuador, Venezuela et al would show that even this forum no longer counts. A case of “adios” to the gringos.

There is all sorts of fun to be had wondering how, or if, this thorny issue might be resolved.

One possibility: Cuba does attend, but walks into a firestorm of criticism about human rights and lack of elections. (Forget it: the Castros haven’t remained in power for 50 years for nothing.)

Another possibility: Raul Castro turns up on the beach at Cartagena for his April holiday anyway, and sidles into the meeting. (Unlikely.)

A third: Cuba attends as just an observer, like Spain and Portugal, which would annoy both Havana and Washington in equal measure, but might give everyone else a laugh.

The problem with this meaningless membership debate, diverting as it might be, is that it masks the real question, and hijacks the real issue. Indeed, it is a diversion.

The real issue the region should be talking about is regional integration – which indeed is the Summit’s main theme. And the real question is why Cuba doesn’t meet the OAS guidelines? (The answer is not just because the US wishes it so: when Cuba was invited to enter negotiations with the OAS in 2009, Havana said it didn’t want to.)

Still, the best defence against criticism is often attack. Indeed, looking at it all from London, the affair is somewhat reminiscent of News International staff’s protests about the heavy-handedness of the police investigation into its Sun newspaper about possible phone-hacking. The Sun’s protest may be valid but is really just a smokescreen for the bigger question: why is there an investigation in the first place?

El ascenso de Brasil inquieta a Suramerica

Foreign Policy/ Manuel Pérez Bella

Todo sigue igual pero algo ha cambiado en Brasilia. La llegada al poder de Dilma Rousseff ha significado un ligero viraje en las relaciones con los vecinos suramericanos, que ven con recelo las aspiraciones hegemónicas de Brasil y echan de menos los agrados y el trato personal que partía de su antecesor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

En su primer año en el poder, Rousseff ha seguido las grandes líneas de la diplomacia de Lula, su padrino político, basadas en la búsqueda de una mayor cooperación en el eje sur-sur con fuerte acento suramericano, pero ha imprimido su estilo propio, más pragmático y más reservado, que ha disgustado a algunos socios. Poco amiga de los discursos, de la parafernalia de las visitas oficiales y de los abrazos con los colegas latinoamericanos, Rousseff disminuyó la agenda de viajes al exterior, que con Lula adquirió un ritmo frenético y llevó al carismático líder sindical a pasar en el extranjero casi un año entero de los ocho que duró su mandato. Rousseff se ausentó del último Foro de Davos y de la Cumbre Iberoamericana del pasado noviembre, lo que se recibió como un agravio en Paraguay, país anfitrión de la cita.

La Presidenta brasileña también ha acabado con los encuentros trimestrales que mantenía su antecesor con Hugo Chávez y ha visitado Venezuela tan solo una vez, coincidiendo con la cumbre fundacional de la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (Celac), proyecto impulsado por Caracas, al que se ha sumado Brasil sin reparos, pero también sin alharacas. En un mensaje enviado al Congreso el pasado enero, Rousseff dijo que la creación de la Celac “reafirma el deseo [de los países de América Latina] de actuar juntos sin tutela externa, con base en una agenda trazada por la propia región”.

No obstante, es notorio que el pragmatismo y la racionalidad han sucedido al trato amistoso y personal que cultivaba Lula con el eje bolivariano, en el que Bolivia y Ecuador no han encontrado hueco en la agenda de Rousseff. Estos países han perdido también un canal directo de comunicación con el palacio de Planalto como era Marco Aurelio García, asesor de la presidencia brasileña que bajo Lula asumía en la práctica las funciones de ministro de Exteriores con los vecinos latinoamericanos y ahora encuentra cerrada la puerta del despacho de Rousseff, que ha decidido a acabar con la bicefalia de la diplomacia y ha desdibujado la figura de Marco Aurelio.

El Gobierno brasileño también ha tenido ya sus primeros roces con Argentina por disputas comerciales y ha anunciado que va a renegociar con México el acuerdo del sector del automóvil firmado en 2002. Todos son indicios de que Brasilia ha acabado con la generosidad y el paternalismo que mostró Lula hacia sus vecinos y ahora, aunque continúe abogando por la integración, parece que va a hacer hincapié en posicionar a Brasil en un lugar predominante, acorde con el tamaño de su economía y con sus aspiraciones de convertirse en un actor geopolítico. En ese sentido, se espera que el Gobierno brasileño retome este año la política de rearme y modernización de las Fuerzas Armadas, suspendida en 2011 por las necesidades de la crisis, con la que pretende destacarse como la potencia militar de la región.

Continúan intactas las aspiraciones de que se incluya al país en la lista de miembros del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU y Rousseff, al igual que su predecesor, no pierde la oportunidad de expresar esta demanda a todo mandatario que visita Brasilia. En esta línea se podrían inscribir los nuevos esfuerzos de acercamiento a China y Estados Unidos, dos de las dos potencias más reticentes a las reformas en la ONU que son, a su vez, los mayores socios comerciales de Brasil, lo que ha llevado a Rousseff a conjugar los esfuerzos para mejorar las relaciones diplomáticas y económicas con ambos países.

El acercamiento a Pekín es palpable y se siente en el creciente peso de la corriente comercial y de las inversiones chinas en Brasil, cuestiones que fueron el tema central de la visita de Rousseff al Imperio del Centro el pasado abril. Las exportaciones brasileñas a China se han cuadruplicado desde 2007 y el gigante asiático se ha convertido de largo en el mayor cliente de Brasil y en uno de los principales inversores en el país, sobre todo en el sector del suministro de materias primas.  Mas >>

El exembajador en español en Cuba nombrado secretario de Estado para Iberoamérica

MADRID, 5 Ene. (EUROPA PRESS) -

   El Gobierno ha nombrado al exembajador en Cuba Jesús Manuel Gracia Aldaz nuevo secretario de Estado para Iberoamérica, ha anunciado la vicepresidenta y portavoz del Ejecutivo, Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría.

   Gracia Aldaz fue embajador de España en Cuba entre 2001 y 2004, cuando fue relevado de su puesto por el Gobierno de José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, que anunció el fin de la política de confrontación con la isla.

   Tras su relevo, Gracia se mostró crítico con el Ejecutivo socialista, al que aconsejó "abandonar su posición de complacencia con la actual dirigencia cubana y apoyar inequívocamente a las fuerzas que trabajan por la democracia y las libertades en Cuba", según consta en un documento publicado por la Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales (FAES).

CELAC, Cain y Castro. Noti-Katungo

El castrismo y la vulnerable democracia latinoamericana ( I )

The Communications Lab’s Blog

Cubanálisis El Think-Tank/ Eugenio Yáñez y Juan Benemelis

Uno de los aspectos que se muestran con mayor orgullo en cualquier balance contemporáneo de América Latina y el Caribe es la existencia de un gigantesco arco democrático que se extiende desde México hasta Argentina y Chile, cubriendo también a todas las islas del Caribe, con la única y bochornosa excepción de la Cuba castrista, donde hace más de medio siglo impera un régimen totalitario.

 

Sin embargo, eso mismo que resulta motivo indiscutible de sano orgullo para todo el hemisferio, está basado en fundamentos y cimientos para nada sólidos, tremendamente vulnerables, y que podrían revertirse en cualquier momento si se dieran las condiciones propicias para ello. Porque las democracias en América Latina y el Caribe, a diferencia de las realidades de América del Norte y Europa, resultan endebles, no se basan en un verdadero Estado de derecho, y sufren de innumerables males y tropiezos que pueden dar al traste con todo lo logrado en poco tiempo, pasando de democracias representativas a democracias “participativas” o “bolivarianas”, como estuvo a punto de suceder en Honduras hace poco, y como no puede descartarse que suceda en otras naciones donde el populismo sienta raíces junto a la corrupción y la indolencia de las élites.

 

En las “democracias” de América Latina no se cumple la regla de oro del barón de Montesquieu, aquella del balance entre los tres poderes de la democracia: el poder ejecutivo, el poder legislativo y el poder judicial. Las repúblicas que nacieron del hecho descolonizador en el continente, allá por el siglo XIX, tuvieron como punto común el desbalance entre los tres poderes. En ellas, el poder ejecutivo, con un “presidente fuerte”, se fue por encima de las legislaturas y del entramado judicial. Así, desde la silla presidencial se gestaban caudillos o iluminados que regían estas repúblicas cual si fueran granjerías de ultramar. Mas >

The Chinese Dragon Sweeps Through Latin America

By Jaime Daremblum

Any U.S. policymakers who doubt the strategic and economic significance of Latin America should spend a few minutes chatting with their counterparts in Beijing.

Over the past decade, China has been on a wild spending spree throughout the Western Hemisphere — targeting Brazilian iron ore, Chilean copper, Peruvian zinc, Argentine soybeans, Venezuelan and Ecuadoran oil, Uruguayan meat, Bolivian lithium, and other economic resources. The Chinese have flooded the region with both investment and cheap labor (about which more later). They are funding construction of a hydroelectric plant for Ecuador, a satellite for Bolivia, and much else. Beijing already built a satellite for Venezuela, which launched in 2008, and a national soccer stadium for Costa Rica, which opened this year. In March 2010, the China National Offshore Oil Company announced that it was purchasing 50 percent of the Argentine firm Bridas, and Bridas subsequently bought a $7.1 billion stake in the Argentina-based Pan American Energy. In October, another Chinese energy giant, Sinopec, agreed to invest over $7 billion in the Brazilian operations of Repsol, a Spanish company.

FULL STORY