sábado, enero 03, 2015
jueves, octubre 16, 2014
Paul Kan is Professor of National Security Studies at the US Army War College and a former bartender. This particular episode in the Cuban Missile Crisis is recounted in two excellent books: Michael Dobbs’ One Minute To Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War and William Taubman’s Khrushchev: A Man and his Era.
lunes, marzo 17, 2014
viernes, agosto 30, 2013
miércoles, junio 19, 2013
jueves, diciembre 27, 2012
jueves, diciembre 13, 2012
viernes, noviembre 16, 2012
lunes, octubre 01, 2012
sábado, septiembre 15, 2012
William Burr - 202/994-7000 or email@example.com
The National Security Archive obtained the virtually unexpurgated document in response to a mandatory declassification review request to the Jimmy Carter Library [See Document 12]. Highly classified for years, PD 59 was signed during a period of heightened Cold War tensions owing to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, greater instability in the Middle East, and earlier strains over China policy, human rights, the Horn of Africa, and Euromissiles.
In this context, the press coverage quickly generated controversy by raising apprehensions that alleged changes in U.S. strategy might lower the threshold of a decision by either side to go nuclear, which could inject dangerous uncertainty into the already fragile strategic balance. The press coverage elicited debate inside and outside the government, with some arguing that the PD would aggravate Cold War tensions by increasing Soviet fears about vulnerability and raising pressures for launch-on-warning in a crisis. Adding to the confusion was the fact that astonishingly, even senior government officials who had concerns about the directive did not have access to it.
With other recently declassified material related to PD-59, today's publication helps settle the mystery of what Jimmy Carter actually signed,  as well as shedding light on the origins of PD-59 and some of its consequences. Among the disclosures are a variety of fascinating insights about the thinking of key U.S. officials about the state of nuclear planning and the possible progression of events should war break out:
- PD-59 sought a nuclear force posture that ensured a "high high degree of flexibility, enduring survivability, and adequate performance in the face of enemy actions." If deterrence failed, the United States "must be capable of fighting successfully so that the adversary would not achieve his war aims and would suffer costs that are unacceptable." To make that feasible, PD-59 called for pre-planned nuclear strike options and capabilities for rapid development of target plans against such key target categories as "military and control targets," including nuclear forces, command-and-control, stationary and mobile military forces, and industrial facilities that supported the military. Moreover, the directive stipulated strengthened command-control-communications and intelligence (C3I) systems.
- President Carter's first instructions on the U.S. nuclear force posture, in PD-18, "U.S. National Strategy," supported "essential equivalence", which rejected a "strategic force posture inferior to the Soviet Union" or a "disarming first strike" capability, and also sought a capability to execute "limited strategic employment options."
- A key element of PD-59 was to use high-tech intelligence to find nuclear weapons targets in battlefield situations, strike the targets, and then assess the damage-a "look-shoot-look" capability. A memorandum from NSC military aide William Odom depicted Secretary of Defense Harold Brown doing exactly that in a recent military exercise where he was "chasing [enemy] general purpose forces in East Europe and Korea with strategic weapons."
- The architects of PD-59 envisioned the possibility of protracted nuclear war that avoided escalation to all-out conflict. According to Odom's memorandum, "rapid escalation" was not likely because national leaders would realize how "vulnerable we are and how scarce our nuclear weapons are." They would not want to "waste" them on non-military targets and "days and weeks will pass as we try to locate worthy targets."
- An element of PD-59 that never leaked to the press was a pre-planned option for launch-on-warning. It was included in spite of objections from NSC staffers, who saw it as "operationally a very dangerous thing."
- Secretary of State Edmund Muskie was uninformed about PD-59 until he read it about in the newspapers, according to a White House chronology. The State Department had been involved in early discussions of nuclear targeting policy, but National Security Adviser Brzezinski eventually cut out the Department on the grounds that targeting is "so closely related to military contingency planning, an activity that justly remains a close-hold prerogative and responsibility" of the Pentagon.
- The drafters of PD 59 accepted controversial ideas that the Soviets had a concept of victory in nuclear war and already had limited nuclear options. Marshall Shulman, the Secretary of State's top adviser on Soviet affairs, had not seen PD-59 but questioned these ideas in a memorandum to Secretary Muskie: "We may be placing more weight on the Soviet [military] literature than is warranted." If the Soviets perused U.S. military writing, it could "easily convince them that we have such options and such beliefs." Post-Cold War studies suggest that Shulman was correct because the Soviet leadership realized that neither side could win a nuclear war and had little confidence in the Soviet Union's ability to survive a nuclear conflict.
BackgroundWhen Jimmy Carter became president in January 1977, he inherited nuclear weapons targeting policies from his Republican predecessors, who had sought ways to give U.S. presidents alternatives to the terrifyingly massive and rigid pre-planned options of the Single Integrated Operational Plan [SIOP]. To make nuclear threats more plausible and to give presidents more choices than the SIOP attack options, in January 1974, Richard Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum [NSDM] 242. A few months later, in April 1974, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger signed Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy [NUWEP] which provided guidance for the creation of limited, selective, and regional attacks, with more detail for major attack options. Among the goals set for Major Attack Options in the NUWEP was the destruction of "selected economic and military resources of the enemy critical to post-war recovery," including political and military leadership targets. With respect to economic recovery targets, the NUWEP called for inflicting "moderate damage on facilities comprising approximately 70% of [the Soviet or Chinese] war-supporting economic base."
The perception that the NSDM-242 exercise had not given the President more options for crisis-confrontation situations [see Document 1 below] led the Carter White House to initiate a nuclear targeting review that eventually produced PD-59. The Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff [JSTPS] had shown proficiency in creating massively destructive "pre-planned" nuclear strikes against Soviet military targets, but the Carter White House saw them as largely irrelevant. As Bzezinski explained, the "very likelihood of all out nuclear war is increased if all out spasm war is the only kind of nuclear war we can fight." Starting with the premise that conflict was more likely to start in Central Europe or Northeast Asia, the architects of PD-59 believed that high-tech reconnaissance systems could give the president and his advisers a "look-shoot-look" capability to improvise targeting during war. In this way, they could strike Warsaw Pact forces on the move with nuclear weapons instead of launching SIOP attacks against major military targets in the Soviet Union.
The JSTPS had responsibility for the SIOP, under the direction of an Air Force general who wore a second hat as Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command. In this capacity, he had a powerful influence in the military bureaucracy. Brzezinski aide William Odom saw little value to the massive SIOP attack options, believing that a flexible targeting system could help provide an adequate deterrent, but he could not wish SAC and the SIOP out existence because its leaders believed that those options were critical to the national defense. Thus, PD 59 was necessarily a bureaucratic compromise by providing for pre-planned attack options, including launch-on-warning but also flexibility to prepare war plans on "short notice" and strategic reserve forces for later stages of a conflict. War plans could range from massive attacks to "flexible sub-options" against broad classes of targets. To ensure that attack plans could be improvised, PD-59 mandated the creation of "staff capabilities" in the military and at the Pentagon that could "develop operational plans on short notice … based on the latest intelligence."
War plans developed under PD-59 were to "put the major weight of the initial response on military and control targets." Target systems would include tactical and strategic nuclear forces, military command centers, conventional military forces including armies in motion, and industrial facilities supporting military operations. Dropping "critical" recovery targets as a priority, pre-planned options would include "attacks on the political control system and on general industrial capability" either promptly or as "relatively prolonged withholds" that could be attacked later in a conflict. Yet the initial press coverage of PD-59 was slightly misleading by suggesting that targeting before the directive had focused on urban centers; the SIOP had always given priority to military targets and had provisions for excluding attacks on urban-industrial complexes unless Moscow had already attacked U.S. cities.
That the White House had initiated a major review of nuclear targeting remained largely secret until President Carter signed PD-59.  Nevertheless, the administration's interest in acquiring capabilities, such as the MX ICBM, for counterforce strikes against Soviet strategic targets had been in the news before the existence of the PD leaked.  In early August 1980 headline in national newspapers brought out the larger secret: the existence a new directive changing nuclear war planning, with the first story appearing in the Boston Globe on 3 August 1980. The news stories correctly emphasized key elements of PD-59, that it sought capabilities for "prolonged but limited nuclear war," and that it gave priority to military and leadership targets, and a capability to "find new targets and destroy them" once a war began. 
The press coverage cited "shudders" among former government officials such as Herbert Scoville who worried that the search for "less fearsome options for using nuclear weapons would reduce the inhibitions for employing them." Moreover, Federation of American Scientists Director Jeremy Stone asked "Who would be there to turn off the war if we nuked Soviet command centers?" Stone warned about pressures for "firing on warning", although the language on launch-on-warning was one element of the PD that stayed secret.  Those concerns dovetailed with private misgivings among State Department officials, such as Marshall Shulman who worried that the reported emphasis on the role of leadership and C3I targets could "only increase Soviet perceptions of vulnerability" and introduce "further instability in the strategic balance."
Newspaper stories about PD-59 raised questions whether President Carter and his advisers had adequately consulted Secretary of State Muskie and the State Department before or after signing the PD. Muskie first learned about the PD from the press coverage, which then noted his "unhappiness that he knew so little about the new doctrine." This became an issue at the State Department, which did not have a copy of the directive and where senior officials argued that the Department should be involved in the "formulation and assessment of national security decisions that have significant foreign policy implications." Muskie's top advisers recommended that he seek an understanding with President Carter that this should not have happened and should not happen again, but whether the two reached a meeting of the minds on this point is not clear.
One of the purposes of the PD was to influence more detailed guidance on nuclear targeting. Top-level officials at the Pentagon and the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff would use the ideas codified in the directive to develop more detailed instructions for shaping the production of pre-planned options and for developing "look-shoot-look" capabilities. By October 1980, Secretary of Defense Brown had approved the latest Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy to provide guidance for targeting in a crisis [see Document 21] Yet the ink had hardly dried on Brown's NUWEP when Ronald Reagan defeated Jimmy Carter for the presidency; in October 1981 the new administration supplanted PD-59 with National Security Decision Directive 13, "Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy." NSDD-13 influenced NUWEP-82 which replaced Brown's guidance.
NSDD-13 remains largely classified, but years later, Odom wrote that it "carr[ied] the general thrust of PD-59, but with less comprehension of what was needed," and that "little or nothing of consequence was done to pursue this doctrinal change."  Future declassifications may test the accuracy of Odom's judgments. In any event, PD-59 (as well as NSDM-242) set the mold for target planning during the decades that followed, during and after the Cold War era. According to a recent Government Accountability Office report, "the process for developing nuclear targeting and employment guidance … has remained virtually unchanged since 1991." Presidential directives and secretary of defense guidance approved during the George W. Bush administration included familiar themes. They provided for a planning structure "designed to avoid an 'all-or-nothing' response to a nuclear attack," identified "potential adversaries" and "scenarios" requiring pre-planned options, and emphasized a "capability to rapidly develop new options." While President Obama has set a nuclear-free world as a policy goal, it is unlikely that nuclear planning arrangements will change significantly in the foreseeable future.
lunes, julio 09, 2012
Eisenhower’s statement came in response to a threat issued by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. In a Moscow speech, Khrushchev said the Soviet Union was prepared to use its missiles to protect Cuba from U.S. military intervention. “One should not forget,” Khrushchev declared, “that now the United States is no longer at an unreachable distance from the Soviet Union as it was before.” He charged that the United States was “plotting insidious and criminal steps” against Cuba.
As charges and countercharges flew between the Cold War rivals, Castro said in a July 9 Havana radio interview: “They have done all they can to remove the revolutionary government … [But] we are acting with reason and right on our side. They are acting against reason, right and history. We are certain we will emerge victorious in this struggle. We are absolutely certain we will win the economic battle.”
Read more: http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0712/78209.html#ixzz208xEIoCJ
miércoles, mayo 23, 2012
domingo, marzo 25, 2012
jueves, marzo 01, 2012
|Zbigniew Brzezinski with Deng Xiaoping|
- Reports that the mistaken use of a nuclear exercise tape on a NORAD computer had produced a U.S. false warning and alert actions prompted Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev to write secretly to President Carter that the erroneous alert was "fraught with a tremendous danger." Further, "I think you will agree with me that there should be no errors in such matters."
- Commenting on the November 1979 NORAD incident, senior State Department adviser Marshal Shulman wrote that "false alerts of this kind are not a rare occurrence" and that there is a "complacency about handling them that disturbs me."
- With U.S.-Soviet relations already difficult, the Brezhnev message sparked discussion inside the Carter administration on how best to reply. Hard-liners prevailed and the draft that was approved included language ("inaccurate and unacceptable") that Marshal Shulman saw as "snotty" and "gratuitously insulting."
- Months later, in May and June 1980, 3 more false alerts occurred. The dates of two of them, 3 and 6 June 1980, have been in the public record for years, but the existence of a third event, cited in a memorandum from Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter on 7 June 1980, has hitherto been unknown, although the details are classified.
- False alerts by NORAD computers on 3 and 6 June 1980 triggered routine actions by SAC and the NMCC to ensure survivability of strategic forces and command and control systems. The National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP) at Andrews Air Force Base taxied in position for emergency launch, although it remained in place. Because missile attack warning systems showed nothing unusual, the alert actions were suspended.
- Supposedly causing the incidents in June 1980 was the failure of a 46¢ integrated circuit ("chip") in a NORAD computer, but Secretary of Defense Brown reported to a surprised President Carter that NORAD "has been unable to get the suspected circuit to fail again under tests."
- In reports to Carter, Secretary cautioned that "we must be prepared for the possibility that another, unrelated malfunction may someday generate another false alert." Nevertheless, Brown argued that "human safeguards"—people reading data produced by warning systems--ensured that there would be "no chance that any irretrievable actions would be taken."
More The National Security Archive >>
domingo, octubre 30, 2011
- The atomic bombings of Hiroshima-Nagasaki
- The impact of World War II bombing operations on nuclear strategy
- The Cold War and the origins of deterrence
- The creation of the Strategic Air Command
- The invention and impact of thermonuclear weapons
- Debates over massive retaliation and flexible response
- The origins and development of the Single integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)
- The Cuban Missile Crisis
- Détente and arms control
- The search for limited nuclear options
- The end of the Cold War and the reform of nuclear targeting
- Concern during the 1980s that nuclear targeting was "out of control"
- "Rogue states," nuclear proliferation, and missile defense
- The impact of 9/11 and debates over deterrence during G.W. Bush administration
domingo, octubre 09, 2011
viernes, agosto 12, 2011
Some of the documents posted today were released by the CIA through its CREST database at the National Archives, College Park. As a few of them are heavily excised, the National Security Archive has requested further declassification review. Other relevant documents--CIA daily reports to President Kennedy during the Wall crisis--remain classified because of agency insistence that sources and methods are at risk. The Archive has appealed these denials.
Read more >
domingo, agosto 07, 2011
"EN TIEMPOS DIFÍCILES" - Heberto Padilla
A aquel hombre le pidieron su tiempo
para que lo juntara al tiempo de la Historia.
Le pidieron las manos,
porque para una época difícil
nada hay mejor que un par de buenas manos.
Le pidieron los ojos
que alguna vez tuvieron lágrimas
para que contemplara el lado claro
(especialmente el lado claro de la vida)
porque para el horror basta un ojo de asombro.
Le pidieron sus labios
resecos y cuarteados para afirmar,
para erigir, con cada afirmación, un sueño
le pidieron las piernas
duras y nudosas
(sus viejas piernas andariegas),
porque en tiempos difíciles
¿algo hay mejor que un par de piernas
para la construcción o la trinchera?
Le pidieron el bosque que lo nutrió de niño,
con su árbol obediente.
Le pidieron el pecho, el corazón, los hombros.
que eso era estrictamente necesario.
Le explicaron después
que toda esta donación resultaria inútil.
sin entregar la lengua,
porque en tiempos difíciles
nada es tan útil para atajar el odio o la mentira.
Y finalmente le rogaron
que, por favor, echase a andar,
porque en tiempos difíciles
esta es, sin duda, la prueba decisiva.
ANALISIS ESPECIALES SOBRE EL NEOKAXTRIZMO
- 89,000 razones para el cambio
- Análisis del neocastrismo entre huevos con jamón y tostadas
- Aproximación a Cuba desde la Teoría del Caos ( I )
- Biología y sucesión ( 2 ): La política económica de la subsistencia
- Biología y sucesión: El Pacto de los Comandantes y el Pacto de los Generales
- Biología y sucesión: ¿A quién mejor que a la familia?
- Cuba, entre la lógica y la incertidumbre
- Cuba, entre la lógica y la incertidumbre
- Cuba: Crisis del sistema bancario o crisis del pensamiento económico
- Cuba: Las reformas y la empresa pública del Neocastrismo I
- Cuba: Las reformas y la empresa pública del neocastrismo ( II )
- Cuba: Nudos Gordianos o ¿dónde dejaron el portaaviones?
- Del Castrismo a la castracion
- Economia Politica de la Transicion en Cuba 
- Economía política de la transición (2): La pobreza estructural como mecanismo de dominación
- Economía política de la transición (3): Las claves de la pobreza estructural
- El Neocastrismo posible
- El Síndrome del Neocastrismo
- El Zhuanda Fangxiao cubano: mantener lo grande, deshacerse de lo pequeño/
- El caos y la logica difusa en el Castrismo
- El estado de bienestar del Neocastrismo: “Lucha tu alpiste pichón”
- El menú del neocastrismo: pato pekinés y hallacas venezolanas/ Eugenio Yáñez
- El neocastrismo: “revolución” sin ideología
- El secuestro de la Ciencia Cubana por Fidel Castro
- El ¨sucre¨: fracaso anunciado de un golpe de estado
- Elecciones en Cuba: Control Político, Manipulación y Testosterona Biranica [II]
- Elecciones en Cuba: Control Político, Manipulación y Testosterona Biranica [I]
- Estrategias medievales en el siglo XXI
- La antesala del entierro político de Fidel Castro
- La caja de Pandora del castrismo: la sucesión
- La ¨Rana Hirviendo¨ del Castrismo
- Los caminos hacia la Cuba post-castrista
- Los funerales del hombre nuevo
- Los múltiples síndromes del "Papá Estado" cubano
- Neocastrismo y Vaticano: liturgias y Vía Crucis. El camino de Tarzán
- Neocastrismo, diplomacia "revolucionaria" y wikiboberías
- Por un puñado de dólares
- Raúl Castro en el año del Dragón ( I )
- TRES AÑOS DE RAULISMO ( I I I, FINAL): Sombras nada más
- Unificación Monetaria en Cuba: Un arroz con mango neocastrista 
- Unificación Monetaria en Cuba: Un arroz con mango neocastrista 
- Unificación Monetaria en Cuba: arroz con mango neocastrista [FINAL]
- Vivienda y Castrismo. La mezcla se endurece
- ¿Perestroika a la cubana?
- Daily Planet Map
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Estadisticas mundiales en tiempo real
- Foreign Affairs
- Fox Nation
- Global Incident Map
- Global Security
- Human Progress
- New Zeal
- Power Wall
- Pulitzer Center
- Ted Ideas
- The Albert Einstein Institution
- The Blaze
- The Daily Beast
- The Global Report
- The National Security Archive
- The Peak
- Trends Research Institute
- What does it mean
- World Audit
Carta desde la carcel de Fidel Castro Ruz
“…después de todo, para mí la cárcel es un buen descanso, que sólo tiene de malo el que es obligatorio. Leo mucho y estudio mucho. Parece increíble, las horas pasan como si fuesen minutos y yo, que soy de temperamento intranquilo, me paso el día leyendo, apenas sin moverme para nada. La correspondencia llega normalmente…”
“…En cuanto a fumar, en estos días pasados he estado rico: una caja de tabacos H. Upman del doctor Miró Cardona, dos cajas muy buenas de mi hermano Ramón….”.
“Me voy a cenar: spaghettis con calamares, bombones italianos de postre, café acabadito de colar y después un H. Upman #4. ¿No me envidias?”.
“…Me cuidan, me cuidan un poquito entre todos. No le hacen caso a uno, siempre estoy peleando para que no me manden nada. Cuando cojo el sol por la mañana en shorts y siento el aire de mar, me parece que estoy en una playa… ¡Me van a hacer creer que estoy de vacaciones! ¿Qué diría Carlos Marx de semejantes revolucionarios?”.
"No temas ni a la prision, ni a la pobreza, ni a la muerte. Teme al miedo" - Giacomo Leopardi
¨Por eso es muy importante, Vicky, hijo mío, que recuerdes siempre para qué sirve la cabeza: para atravesar paredes¨– Halvar de Flake [El vikingo]
"Como no me he preocupado de nacer, no me preocupo de morir" - Lorca
"Al final, no os preguntarán qué habéis sabido, sino qué habéis hecho" - Jean de Gerson
"Si queremos que todo siga como está, es necesario que todo cambie" - Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa
"Todo hombre paga su grandeza con muchas pequeñeces, su victoria con muchas derrotas, su riqueza con múltiples quiebras" - Giovanni Papini
"Life is what happens while you are busy making other plans" - John Lennon
"Habla bajo, lleva siempre un gran palo y llegarás lejos" - Proverbio Africano
"No hay medicina para el miedo" - Proverbio escoces
"El supremo arte de la guerra es doblegar al enemigo sin luchar" - Sun Tzu
"You do not really understand something unless you can explain it to your grandmother" - Albert Einstein
"It is inaccurate to say I hate everything. I am strongly in favor of common sense, common honesty, and common decency. This makes me forever ineligible for public office" - H. L. Menken
"I swore never to be silent whenever and wherever human beings endure suffering and humiliation. We must always take sides. Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim. Silence encourages the tormentor, never the tormented" - Elie Wiesel
"Stay hungry, stay foolish" - Steve Jobs
"If you put the federal government in charge of the Sahara Desert , in five years ther'ed be a shortage of sand" - Milton Friedman
"The tragedy of modern man is not that he knows less and less about the meaning of his own life, but that it bothers him less and less" - Vaclav Havel
"No se puede controlar el resultado, pero si lo que uno haga para alcanzarlo" - Vitor Belfort [MMA Fighter]
Para Raul Castro
Cuba ocupa el lugar 147 entre 153 paises evaluados en "Democracia, Mercado y Transparencia 2007"
Enlaces sobre Cuba:
- ALBERTO MÜLLER
- Abicu Liberal
- Agencia de Prensa Libre Oriental
- Asociation for the study of the Cuban Economy
- Babalu blog
- Bitacora Cubana
- Centro de Estudios de la Economia Cubana
- Cine Cuba
- Conexion Cubana
- Conexion Cubana/Osvaldo
- Cuba Futuro
- Cuba Independiente
- Cuba Matinal
- Cuba Net
- Cuba Standard
- Cuba Study Group
- Cuba al Pairo
- Cuba transition project
- Cuba/ Brookings Institution
- Cubano Libre blog
- El Blog del Forista 'El Compañero'
- El Republicano Liberal
- El Tono de la Voz
- Emilio Ichikawa blog
- Estancia Cubana
- Esteban Casañas Lostal/ La Isla
- Estudios Económicos Cubanos
- Exilio Cubano
- Fernando Gonzalez
- Freedom for Dr. Biscet!
- Fundacion Canadiense para las Americas: Cuba
- Fundacion Lawton de Derechos Humanos
- Gaspar, El Lugareño
- Global Security
- Guaracabuya: Organo Oficial de la Sociedad Economica de Amigos del Pais
- Humanismo y Conectividad
- Humberto Fontova
- IRI: International Republic Institute
- Ideas Ocultas
- Jinetero,... y que?
- La Finca de Sosa
- La Nueva Cuba
- La Primavera de Cuba
- La pagina del Dr. Antonio de la Cova
- Lista de blogs cubanos
- Los Miquis
- Magazine Cubano
- Manuel Diaz Martinez
- Martha Beatriz Roque Info
- Martha Colmenares
- Medicina Cubana
- Movimiento HUmanista Evolucionario Cubano
- Net for Cuba International
- Nueva Europa - Nueva Arabia
- Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas de Cuba
- Penultimos Dias
- Pinceladas de Cuba
- Postal de Cuba
- Real Instituto Elcano
- Repensando la rebelión cubana de 1952-1959
- Revista Hispano Cubana
- Revista Voces Voces
- Secretos de Cuba
- Sociedad Civil Venezolana
- Spanish Pundit
- SrJacques Online: A Freedom Blog
- Stratfor Global Intelligence
- TV Cuba
- The Havana Note
- The Investigative Project on Terrorism
- The Real Cuba
- The Trilateral Commission
- Union Liberal Cubana/Seccion de Economia y Finanzas
- White House
- Yo Acuso al regimen de Castro
Cuando vinieron a buscar a los sindicalistas, Callé: yo no soy sindicalista.
Cuando vinieron a buscar a los judíos, Callé: yo no soy judío. Cuando vinieron a buscar a los católicos, Callé: yo no soy “tan católico”.
Cuando vinieron a buscarme a mí, Callé: no había quien me escuchara.
Reverendo Martin Niemöller
- * Analisis del saldo migratorio externo cubano 2001-2007
- * Anatomía de un mito: la salud pública en Cuba antes y después de 1959
- * Cuba: Sistema de acueductos y alcantarillados
- * ELECCIONES: Un millon ciento cincuenta y dos mil personas setecientas quince personas muestran su oposicion al regimen
- * El Trinquenio Amargo y la ciudad distópica: autopsia de una utopía/ Conf. del Arq. Mario Coyula
- * Estructura del PIB de Cuba 2007
- * Las dudas de nuestras propias concepciones
- * Republica y rebelion
- Analisis de los resultados de la Sherrit en Cuba
- Circulacion Monetaria: Tienen dinero los cubanos para "hacerle" frente a las medidas "aperturistas" de Raul?
- Cuba-EEUU: Los círculos viciosos y virtuosos de la transición cubana [ 3] / Lazaro Gonzalez
- Cuba-EEUU: Los círculos viciosos y virtuosos de la transición cubana [ I ]/ Lazaro Gonzalez
- Cuba-Estados Unidos: Los Círculos Viciosos y Virtuosos de la transición cubana [ I I ]- Lazaro Gonzalez
- Cuba: Comercio Exterior 2007 y tasas de cambio
- Cuba: Reporte de turistas enero 2008
- Cuba: Sondeo de precios al Mercado Informal
- Estudio de las potencialidades de la produccion de etanol en Cuba
- Reforma de la agricultura en Cuba: Angel Castro observa orgulloso al Sub-Latifundista de Biran al Mando*
- Turismo en Cuba: Un proyecto insostenible. Analisis de los principales indicadores
- Unificación Monetaria en Cuba: Un arroz con mango neocastrista 
CUBA LLORA Y EL MUNDO Y NOSOTROS NO ESCUCHAMOS
Donde estan los Green, los Socialdemocratas, los Ricos y los Pobres, los Con Voz y Sin Voz? Cuba llora y nadie escucha.
Donde estan el Jet Set, los Reyes y Principes, Patricios y Plebeyos? Cuba desesperada clama por solidaridad.
Donde Bob Dylan, donde Martin Luther King, donde Hollywood y sus estrellas? Donde la Middle Class democrata y conservadora, o acaso tambien liberal a ratos? Y Gandhi? Y el Dios de Todos?
Donde los Santos y Virgenes; los Dioses de Cristianos, Protestantes, Musulmanes, Budistas, Testigos de Jehova y Adventistas del Septimo Dia. Donde estan Ochun y todas las deidades del Panteon Yoruba que no acuden a nuestro llanto? Donde Juan Pablo II que no exige mas que Cuba se abra al Mundo y que el Mundo se abra a Cuba?
Que hacen ahora mismo Alberto de Monaco y el Principe Felipe que no los escuchamos? Donde Madonna, donde Angelina Jolie y sus adoptados around de world; o nos hara falta un Brando erguido en un Oscar por Cuba? Donde Sean Penn?
Donde esta la Aristocracia Obrera y los Obreros menos Aristocraticos, donde los Working Class que no estan junto a un pueblo que lanquidece, sufre y llora por la ignominia?
Que hacen ahora mismo Zapatero y Rajoy que no los escuchamos, y Harper y Dion, e Hillary y Obama; donde McCain que no los escuchamos? Y los muertos? Y los que estan muriendo? Y los que van a morir? Y los que se lanzan desesperados al mar?
Donde estan el minero cantabrico o el pescador de percebes gijonese? Los Canarios donde estan? A los africanos no los oimos, y a los australianos con su acento de hombres duros tampoco. Y aquellos chinos milenarios de Canton que fundaron raices eternas en la Isla? Y que de la Queen Elizabeth y los Lords y Gentlemen? Que hace ahora mismo el combativo Principe Harry que no lo escuchamos?
Donde los Rockefellers? Donde los Duponts? Donde Kate Moss? Donde el Presidente de la ONU? Y Solana donde esta? Y los Generales y Doctores? Y los Lam y los Fabelo, y los Sivio y los Fito Paez?
Y que de Canseco y Miñoso? Y de los veteranos de Bahia de Cochinos y de los balseros y de los recien llegados? Y Carlos Otero y Susana Perez? Y el Bola, y Pancho Cespedes? Y YO y TU?
Y todos nosotros que estamos aqui y alla rumiando frustaciones y resquemores, envidias y sinsabores; autoelogios y nostalgias, en tanto Louis Michel comulga con Perez Roque mientras Biscet y una NACION lanquidecen?
Donde Maceo, donde Marti; donde aquel Villena con su carga para matar bribones?
Cuba llora y clama y el Mundo NO ESCUCHA!!!