Buques de guerra de EE.UU. frente a la costa de Siria, Francia propone la intervención de la OTAN

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Israel-Iran: La Guerra que Occidente debe evitar

Los halcones de Israel pueden estar muy cerca de desatar una guerra a gran escala con Irán. El pasado lunes 28 de noviembre, las fuerzas de operaciones especiales israelitas mas como conocidas como la "Mano de Dios", hicieron estallar una parte de la instalación nuclear iraní  de Isfahan.

 

En otro incidente, una explosion en Teheran provoca la muerte de un general irani.

De acuerdo con el Times de Londres, Dan Meridor, ministro de inteligencia israeli, implicitament asumio la responsabilidad con los hechos: "Hay países que imponen sanciones económicas y hay países que actúan de otra manera para hacer frente a la amenaza nuclear iraní."
     

Por su parte el mayor general Giora Eiland, ex director de la seguridad nacional de Israel, declaro a la radio del Ejército de Israel que la explosión Isfahan no fue un accidente: "No hay muchas coincidencias, y cuando hay tantos eventos es probable que haya algún tipo de mano que guía, aunque tal vez es la mano de Dios"

 Otro ex funcionario de inteligencia israelí, menciona al menos dos otras explosiones que habrian neutralizado bases de lanzamiento del misil de alcance medio Shahab-3.

La respuesta "oficial" de Iran llego en la forma del ataque de los estudiantes extremistas a la embajada del Reino Unido en Teheran.  No hay ojo por ojo no por deseos de venganza de los halcones y la jerarquia eclesiastica, sino por imposibilidad de ejecutarla en proporcion a la incursion israeli. No es prudencia o sabidura politica sino impotencia que inflama las llamas de una guerra casi inevitable por parte de los protagonistas principales.

Al margen de las altisonantes declaraciones de los halcones israelies, el pequeno pero poderoso enclave judio en el corazon del medio oriente islamico, no puede actuar a gran escala en solitario. 

 

Ahora mismo los estados mayores politico-militares de un Occidente envuelto en la mayor crisis economica desde la gran recesion [en un escenario optimista] deben estar evaluando cuidadosamente pero  con toda celeridad los impactos que sufririan si una guerra de estas caracteristicas llegara a desatarse.

Considerando solo la variante energetica [a lo que habria que anadir la reaccion del mundo arabe y musulman no solo de la region y el rol que China y Rusia adoptarian ante la conflagracion] de unas economias donde precios de $150 dolares el barril de crudo, provocan una recesion inmediata en sus maltrechas economias, la disminucion de la oferta diaria en el mercado mundial petrolero estimada en mas de 10 millones de barriles como resultado del conflicto, lanzaria los precios por encima de la barrera de los $200 dolares.

Enfrentados a movimientos sociales si bien poco organizados pero desestabilizadores como el Occupy Movement en muchas de las principales metropolis, huelgas de mas de dos millones de trabajadores publicos en el Reino Unido, una Zona Euro en crisis estructural cronica que amenaza su desintegracion, mientras su poblacion volcada en las plazas rechaza la aplicacion de los programas de austeridad previstos y una Union Europea que acaba de ser apuntalada por los bancos centrales occidentales para atenuar los negativos impactos en sus respectivos mercados, no es un escenario alentador para apoyar una incursion israeli en gran escala contra Iran.

How to win any conflict

 siiaonline.org

Global Guerrillas

NOTE:  I'm in the process of modernizing conflict theory (for wars, insurgencies, protests, etc.) and needed to get this backgrounder on John Boyd's thinking out of the way first.  IF any part of it is unclear/difficult to understand, let me know.  I'll improve it.
What is Conflict?
To answer this question, let's start with a theory of conflict developed by the late great John Boyd, America's best military thinker.  It's a bit of a journey, but trust me, it's worth the effort.
Boyd's theory is based on the assumption that all conflict can be reduced to a contest of minds.  Mind vs. Mind.   It doesn't matter whether a conflict is person vs. person or army vs. army or corporation vs. corporation (i.e. Toyota vs. GM).  It doesn't matter what the weapons or technology used in the conflict are.  It doesn't matter where the conflict takes place.  For Boyd, all conflict boils down to a contest of one mind against another (Sun Tzu implies the same thing).
So far, so good.  Let's dig a little deeper.

• Question:  how does a mind "fight"?  Boyd concluded that a mind fights by adapting.  
• This leads us to a Better Question:  how do we adapt?  
• Answer: by making decisions.  The better/faster our decisions the greater our chances of success/survival.  

This then leads us to the next step.  How do we make decisions?  Basically, all organisms follow a simple process. Boyd put this process into a simple decision making model.  It has four steps (called the OODA loop for short,):

1. Observe:  Gather data.  What's changed? Objectivity is paramount.
2. Orient:  Make sense of this data.  Reference all experience/insight.  What does this observation mean?
3. Decide:  What should be done.  Given what has changed, what should be done next.
4. Act:  Make the decision real.    

Ok.  So, what does this all of this decision making stuff mean?
I'm Inside Your OODA Loop
How does all of this apply to conflict?  The simple answer is that conflict, in its most basic form, is a contest between decision making loops.  The side with the FASTER and BETTER decision making loop wins any conflict.  Why?  They adapt quicker.   Here's some more detail:
A FASTER decision making loop means that you accomplish a successful OODA loop quicker than an opponent.  If you can do this, you are inside your opponent's OODA loop.  This means that by the time your opponent responds to your last actions, you are already onto your next ones.  Get far enough ahead and the opponent's decision making process will collapse and victory is assured.
A BETTER decision making loop means that the process you use to make decisions is better than your opponents.  How to make a decision making loop better and how to damage your opponents decision making process is complex.  It can lead to endless debates and theory crafting.  The easiest way to look at it is as a function of connectivity (mental, physical, and moral).  More connectivity typically means better decisions, less/corrupted connectivity means worse.

NOTE: The OODA loop is an excellent way to understand how Zen applies to martial arts.  Zen training consists of repetitive muscle training attack/defense and a clearing of the mind of conscious processes.  What does this do?  It short circuits the orientation and decision steps by making the act instinctual.  You observe, you act.

The Best Defense/ By Thomas E. Ricks

Over the weekend I was looking through some handwritten notes in the papers of Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, placed on-line by the National Defense University. The document is undated and unsigned. The NDU catalog lists it as created by Lemnitzer, who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff early in the JFK era, until Kennedy dumped him in favor of Maxwell Taylor. It looks to me like General Lemnitzer wrote it or perhaps dictated it as he stewed in retirement -- but perhaps not, because on the last page there is a reference to "General Lemnitzer."

Anyway, on pages 43-44 (as handmarked; PDF lists it as pp. 45-46) of that document, I was surprised to see a summary of "CINCLANT's operational plan for Cuba," which seems to have been ordered up after the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961. In summary, the American invasion of Castro's Cuba would begin with an "Assault on the Havana [sic] by the 82nd Airborne Division and one Marine regiment." The next day, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 2nd Infantry Brigade would land. (Grasshoppers, what is "the 2nd Infantry Brigade"? Doesn't ring a specific bell. Maybe the writer mean "division"?) These units would be given 18 days to isolate and capture the capital. Meanwhile, on D+14, the 2nd Marine Division would move toward Santiago. (I don't understand the delay -- why wait two weeks? Surely not to wait for available shipping and air cover.) Between the 24th and 34th days, the two forces would link up.

And then, of course, there is that dose of sunny optimism that ends all U.S. war plans, as if by law: "D+60 to D+90: withdrawal of U.S. forces." Oh, sure.

If the American invasion had happened back then, more people would know who Ted Conway was -- he commanded the 82nd Airborne in 1961-62, and to my knowledge is the only soldier in American history to rise from the lowest rank in the Army to the highest and then in retirement to get a doctorate from Duke.

When Castro buys the collective farm, which should happen pretty soon, if Cuba descends into turmoil, I wonder if these plans will be dusted off...

A medio siglo del abismo: la crisis de los cohetes de 1962 ( I I, FINAL)

Cubanalisis

Diego Trinidad

Los primeros barcos cargueros (de un total de 85) comenzaron a zarpar para Cuba a mediados de julio desde el Mar Negro. Y para asegurar más el secreto de la operación, Khrushchev le ordenó al agente de la GRU y nuevo confidente de Robert Kennedy, que buscara una reunión con Robert, la cual se celebró en la Casa Blanca el 31 de mayo, pues el Presidente decidió participar.

 

Bolshakov le pidió al Presidente, como un “favor” a Khrushchev y para eliminar “provocaciones”, suspender los vuelos de reconocimiento sobre el Caribe y los barcos rusos en rumbo a Cuba.  Kennedy accedió, aunque los vuelos no fueron suspendidos del todo. Kennedy a su vez le pidió a Khrushchev, por mediación del “canal secundario” favorito de los hermanos, que pusiera la cuestión de Berlín “en el hielo” por el momento, lo cual era parte del plan de Khrushchev de todos modos.[1].

 

Pero en agosto todo cambió. Primero, comenzaron a llegar rumores a EEUU de “tubos largos” moviéndose sigilosamente en la noche por las carreteras de Cuba. Estos rumores provenían de exiliados cubanos recién llegados a Miami y entrevistados en el aeropuerto de Opa Locka por la CIA, aunque también de otras fuentes como agentes de gobiernos aliados. Mas la CIA no le daba mucho crédito a los “inventos” o exageraciones de los cubanos que llegaban diariamente a EEUU. Los nuevos exiliados también reportaban la llegada de más y más tropas rusas (a pesar de que llegaban vestidos de civiles).

 

Sin embargo, a los reportes de los pocos aviones que seguían volando sobre los barcos rusos en camino a Cuba sí había que creerlos, sobre todo cuando confirmaban la presencia de largos cilindros tapados por lonas en las cubiertas de muchos cargueros. Muy pronto, los analistas fotográficos del Centro Nacional de Interpretación Fotográfica (NPIC) de la CIA confirmaron que los cilindros muy probablemente eran SAMs. Y la CIA comenzó a presionar al gobierno de que era necesario reanudar los vuelos de aviones U-2 sobre Cuba para tener una idea más clara de lo que en realidad estaba ocurriendo.

 

Pero una vez más,  Dean Rusk se opuso a vuelos de U-2 sobre Cuba por temor a provocar un incidente internacional en caso de que fueran descubiertos, y Rusk contaba con el apoyo del asesor de seguridad nacional McGeorge Bundy esta vez. Ahora la política doméstica intervino, pues los reportes de cubanos recién llegados encontraron acogida en algunos políticos republicanos que estaban involucrados en reñidas campañas en las elecciones congresionales de noviembre, notablemente los senadores Homer Capehart de Indiana y Kenneth Keating de New York. Los dos senadores comenzaron a denunciar al gobierno por permitir la aumentada presencia de soldados y armamentos rusos en Cuba.  Kennedy y sus ayudantes lo negaban, pero las acusaciones continuaban y las encuestas reflejaban que las duras críticas republicanas estaban surtiendo efecto en los votantes. De manera que después de muchas deliberaciones, un vuelo de U-2 sobre Cuba fue autorizado para el 29 de agosto, el mismo día en que Keating por primera vez denunció la presencia de cohetes en Cuba.

 

Minutos después que las fotos de este vuelo fueron reveladas, los analistas fotográficos de NPIC descubrieron ocho sitios bajo construcción de emplazamientos de SAMs.[2] La sensación causada por los descubrimientos del vuelo del 29 de agosto además levantaron la sospecha de John McCone, director de la CIA, quien correctamente dedujo que la presencia de SAMs en Cuba era precursora de la introducción de cohetes estratégicos.[3]

 

Pero antes de que los cohetes estratégicos fueran eventualmente descubiertos por los próximos vuelos de U-2 autorizados, una verdadera batalla campal fue librada por parte de Rusk y Bundy principalmente, opuestos a la autorización de más vuelos de U-2, por temor de que las misiones fueran descubiertas, o peor, que un U-2 fuera derribado, y analistas de la CIA, incluyendo su director, McCone. Memorias de Girón volvieron con las consideraciones políticas prevaleciendo sobre las de seguridad nacional, ahora increíblemente después de descubrir SAMs en Cuba. 

 

Mas la política doméstica también seguía interviniendo, con otro discurso del senador Keating el 31 de agosto denunciando, con todo lujo de detalles, torpederos rusos en Cuba, desembarco de tropas adicionales, vehículos anfibios, tanques de guerra y múltiples convoyes de camiones cerrados conteniendo posibles cohetes dentro, por la configuración de los camiones. Mucho de esto fue luego confirmado por los próximos vuelos autorizados. Los torpederos, por ejemplo, eran lanchas lanzadoras de misiles cruceros conocidas como KOMAR, y tres bases adicionales de SAMs fueron detectadas en los lugares denunciados por Keating, sugiriendo que su información provenía de fuentes confiables.[4] Pero el Secretario de Prensa de Kennedy, Pierre Salinger, continuaba negándolo todo, y el embajador ruso Anatoly Dobrynin igualmente aseguraba al gobierno americano que la URSS nunca introduciría armamentos “ofensivos” en Cuba. Aún así, un nuevo vuelo de U-2 fue autorizado para el 5 de septiembre, sobre áreas de Cuba no cubiertas en el vuelo del 29 de agosto. Tres nuevos sitios de SAMs fueron detectados, más cinco MiGs 21, los más modernos de la URSS, que podían alcanzar hasta 70.000 pies de altura, poniendo en peligro a los U-2 que volaban a esa altura.[5]

 

Una reunión urgente fue citada en la Casa Blanca el 7 de septiembre, cuando Kennedy fue informado en detalle de los descubrimientos de los vuelos del 29 de agosto y del 5 de septiembre. La mayor preocupación mostrada por Kennedy era sobre si los SAMs encontrados podían ser considerados armamentos “ofensivos’, puesto que esto era lo que había prometido al pueblo americano no permitir en Cuba, y también era lo que la URSS había declarado que nunca haría. El Presidente no quedó satisfecho sobre la cuestión y ordenó terminantemente que nada sobre los descubrimientos de los vuelos fuera revelado, especialmente a los medios informativos, amenazando al general Carter y a Ray Price, sub-director de inteligencia de la CIA, con despedirlos “si leo algo sobre esto mañana en el Washington Post”.[6] Bundy reportó más tarde que “El Presidente le dijo al general Carter que esta información no debía ser incluida en publicaciones de inteligencia pendiente a más exacta determinación y ordenó que ningún reporte sobre armamentos que pudieran ser ofensivos fueran publicados sin su aprobación”.[7]

 

Anadyr sufrió modificaciones desde casi el principio, cuando los planeados submarinos nucleares no estuvieron listos para la operación. Una vez más, los esperados adelantos tecnológicos no se materializaban, y en el caso de los submarinos nucleares la situación había sido eminentemente peligrosa, pues primero, en una prueba para lanzar cohetes nucleares, el prototipo Proyecto 658, K-19, el primer submarino nuclear ruso, después de varios intentos fallidos de lanzar un cohete, cuando por fin se logró, el cohete cambió de rumbo en el aire y se autodestruyó, sin siquiera alcanzar la mitad de la trayectoria. Peor, regresando por el Atlántico norte a su base en la URSS, el reactor atómico se sobrecalentó y los 128 marinos de su tripulación malamente escaparon con vida al tener que ser rescatados, aunque todos estuvieron expuestos a cierto grado de radiación y algunos murieron tiempo después.[8]

 

De la misma manera, los barcos de guerra rusos necesarios para proteger a los cargueros con sus cohetes, cabezas nucleares y demás componentes de Anadyr, simplemente no existían, gracias a una decisión tomada años antes por Khrushchev. Poco después de asumir sus funciones de jefe supremo de la URSS en 1955, debido a un accidente en el Mar Negro que explotó y hundió el gigantesco barco de guerra Novorossysk, con la pérdida de toda la tripulación de 608 marinos rusos, un enfurecido Khrushchev paró en seco la expansión de la marina rusa ordenada por Stalin en los años 50, y nombró a un héroe de la Guerra Patria (como llamaban los rusos a la Segunda Guerra Mundial), el almirante Gorshkov, nuevo jefe de la marina. Al final de 1957, 350 barcos de guerra habían sido retirados y la construcción de submarinos de petróleo también había sido reducida en favor de submarinos nucleares. Cuando Khrushchev necesitó barcos para escoltar y proteger a los cargueros en ruta a Cuba, no había ninguno disponible. Khrushchev airadamente increpó a Gorshkov: “¿Cómo es posible que no haya barcos?” Gorshkov contestó: “Pero señor, usted ordenó que se destruyeran”. A lo que Khrushchev increíblemente replicó, “¡Yo no ordené tal cosa!” [9] Así era Khrushchev.

 

Así que sólo se pudieron mandar cuatro submarinos petroleros para “proteger” a la gigantesca armada en camino a Cuba en el verano de 1962. Pero con una peculiaridad desconocida hasta hace muy poco: cada uno contaba con un torpedo con cabeza nuclear, el cual podía destruir una flotilla entera de Grupo de Portaviones americano, un área enorme en la superficie del Mar Caribe, y un seguro inicio de una guerra nuclear general si se producía tal ataque submarino. Además, y otra vez increíblemente ¡los cuatro comandantes de los submarinos petroleros clase Foxtrot que iban hacia Cuba estaban autorizados a usar los torpedos nucleares! Así fue la orden del almirante Gorshkov al almirante Rybalko, jefe de la Operación Kama, la porción maritima de Anadyr: “Usted usará estas armas [los torpedos atómicos] si las fuerzas americanas atacan a sus submarinos… o si recibe órdenes de Moscú de hacerlo”.[10] Y todo esto cuando esos torpedos nucleares sólo habían sido probados DOS veces, ambas veces explotando antes de tiempo y antes de alcanzar sus objetivos.

 

La operación Anadyr fue descubierta cuando los vuelos de U-2 fueron finalmente re-autorizados por Kennedy a finales de septiembre, aunque por la nubosidad sobre Cuba, hasta el 14 de octubre no se pudo realizar el que descubrió los cohetes. Dos días después Kennedy fue informado de la evidencia y se le mostraron las fotos por el director de NPIC, Arthur Lundahl.

 

Inmediatamente, un mecanismo para lidiar con la Crisis fue confeccionado por la Casa Blanca, denominado ExComm (indicando Comité Ejecutivo de la Agencia Nacional de Seguridad). Y comenzaron las deliberaciones sobre qué hacer al respecto, después de todas las seguridades a Kennedy de que esto nunca sucedería, desde su asesor de seguridad Bundy, pasando por el director de la Oficina Nacional de Estimados, Sherman Kent (“creemos que el aumento de la capacidad militar rusa en Cuba comenzada en julio no refleja una política rusa radicalmente nueva hacia Cuba”)[11] y, por supuesto, terminando por los rusos, quienes negaron la presencia de cohetes aún después de haber sido descubiertos. Todavía el 18 de octubre, cuando Kennedy malamente se pudo contener de mostrar las fotos que guardaba en su buró, en una reunión con Gromyko en la Casa Blanca, el ministro ruso una vez más le dio al Presidente las mayores seguridades de que las armas y “asesores” rusos en Cuba eran estrictamente para proteger a Cuba.

 

El ExComm se reunió por primera vez el 16 de octubre. En esa primera reunión estaban presentes, además del presidente y su hermano Robert, por el Departamento de Estado, el Secretario  Dean Rusk, los Sub-secretarios Charles Bohlen y George Ball, el Secretario de Estado Asistente para Latinoamérica Edwin Martin, y el asistente presidencial y Embajador at large Llewellyn Thompson. Por el Departamento de Defensa, el Secretario Robert McNamara y sus asistentes Roswell Gilpatric y Paul Nitze. Por la CIA, como el Director McCone estaba fuera del país, estaban el Sub-Director Marshall Carter y el Director de NPIC Arthur Lundahl. El Secretario del Tesoro Douglas Dillon (por ser republicano principalmente), el Asesor de Seguridad presidencial McGeorge Bundy, el ayudante de Kennedy y principal escritor de sus discursos Ted Sorensen, y el General Maxwell Taylor, jefe del Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas americanas redondeaban el grupo inicial del ExComm esa primera mañana.

 

Mas >

The Cuban Missile Crisis Myth: 49 Years Later

Page Magazine

By Humberto Fontova 

Forty nine years ago on Oct. 28^th JFK “solved” the Cuban Missile Crisis​. Given the influence of Camelot’s court scribes and their cronies in the mainstream media, perhaps a refresher on conservative reaction to this “solution” is in order:

“We locked Castro’s communism into Latin America and threw away the key to its removal,” growled Barry Goldwater​.

“Kennedy pulled defeat out of the jaws of victory,” wrote Richard Nixon​. “Then gave the Soviets squatters rights in our backyard.”

“We’ve been had!” yelled then Navy Chief George Anderson upon hearing on October 28, 1962, how JFK “solved” the missile crisis. Adm. Anderson was the man in charge of the very “blockade” against Cuba.

“The biggest defeat in our nation’s history!” bellowed Air Force Chief Curtis Lemay, while whacking his fist on his desk.

“We missed the big boat,” said Gen. Maxwell Taylor​ after learning the details of the deal with Khrushchev.

“It’s a public relations fable that Khrushchev quailed before Kennedy,” wrote Alexander Haig​. “The legend of the eyeball to eyeball confrontation invented by Kennedy’s men paid a handsome political dividend. But the Kennedy-Khrushchev deal was a deplorable error resulting in political havoc and human suffering through the Americas.”

Even Democrats despaired. “This nation lacks leadership,” said Dean Acheson​, the Democratic elder statesman whom Kennedy consulted on the matter. “The meetings were repetitive and without direction. Most members of Kennedy’s team had no military or diplomatic experience whatsoever. The sessions were a waste of time.” 

More >

Obama: Mensaje al resto de los Dictadores

Newsreel: The Red Threat. President Orders Cuban Blockade, 1962/10/22

JFK speaks on Cuban Missile Crisis - "Soviet military buildup on the island of Cuba" - "a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment has been initiated" - "clandestine, reckless" - JFK had meeting with Gromyko

Newsreel: The Cuban Crisis, 1962/10/25

Adlai Stevenson at UN speaks on Cuban Missile Crisis; Castro builds up defenses in Cuba; cameras installed in airplane, photos show details, MiG-21 jets, OAS endorsed US in 20-0 vote, Dean Rusk shown at this meeting; Guantanamo base marines arrive; UN building exterior, Adlai Stevenson speaks.

10 years in Afghanistan

Military.com

Ten years after America began its war in Afghanistan, the decade can be measured by different yardsticks: Dollars. Deployments. Deaths. Or maybe this striking fact: Some Soldiers have childhood memories of when the fighting began. A decade is longer than the time ground troops were in Vietnam, longer than the Revolutionary War.
Full Story

The 6 Most Gigantic Everything in the History of War

Cracked

In the words of Mahatma Gandhi, "War makes people act like dicks." We don't want to glorify war or otherwise portray it as something other than terrible. Yet, war makes people think big, and sometimes you have to sit back and be amazed by what humans can accomplish when they really, really want to kill each other.

#6.The Big Gun: The Schwerer Gustav

The Gustav is the biggest gun ever fired in combat, period.
"Heavy Gustav," as the Germans called it, was 150 feet-long and weighed 2.7 million pounds (or, as much as 750 full-sized sedans). If you're having trouble grasping the scale of this monster, let's look at the shells it fired:

That's not a toy tank sitting in this thing's shadow. The shells were 11 feet-long, and nearly three feet wide. They weighed 14,000 pounds. The Gustav could hurl them 23 miles. It took a half hour just to load it.
If you're wondering why the war didn't end the moment they rolled this terror onto the battlefield, you have to realize how laughably impractical the thing was. It took 250 men to get it assembled and ready to fire, then another 2,500 to lay twin rails for the damn thing just so they could move it towards Russia, the only country on Earth large enough for Heavy Gustav to hit.

It was basically a weaponized suspension bridge.

The Germans actually tried to fit Gustav's 800 millimeter gun onto a tank, the aptly-named Landkreuzer P. 1500 Monster (yes, Monster). Fortunately, it never left the drawing board of a man who we suspect had a very small penis.

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Libya and the Problem with The Hague

By George Friedman |

The war in Libya has been under way for months, without any indication of when it might end. Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi’s faction has been stronger and more cohesive than imagined and his enemies weaker and more divided. This is not unusual. There is frequently a perception that dictators are widely hated and that their power will collapse when challenged. That is certainly true at times, but often the power of a dictator is rooted in the broad support of an ideological faction, an ethnic group or simply those who benefit from the regime. As a result, naive assumptions of rapid regime change are quite often replaced by the reality of protracted conflict.

This has been a characteristic of what we have called “humanitarian wars,” those undertaken to remove a repressive regime and replace it with one that is more representative. Defeating a tyrant is not always easy. Gadhafi did not manage to rule Libya for 42 years without some substantial support. Read more »

Female Special Operators Now in Combat

Military.com|by Christian Lowe

Army Special Operations Command has deployed its first teams of female Soldiers assigned to commando units in Afghanistan, and military officials are assessing their initial performance in theater as "off the charts."
In a controversial move early this year, the Army created a new avenue for women to serve with front-line combat units in some of the most specialized and covert missions. The so-called "Cultural Support Teams" are attached to Special Forces and Ranger units to interface with the female population to gain vital intelligence and provide social outreach.
"When I send an [SF team] in to follow up on a Taliban hit … wouldn't it be nice to have access to about 50 percent of that target population -- the women?" said Maj. Gen. Bennet Sacolick, commander of the Army Special Warfare Center and School, which runs the CST program.

Read more...

Aerial Bombing, No Longer an Act of War

NoisyRoom
By: Terresa Monroe-Hamilton

Welcome to a whole string of kinetic military actions employed through the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine of the Obama Administration. You know, where aerial bombing of a country is no longer considered an act of war. It’s humanitarian don’tcha know…

And Congress is now totally useless in fact and deed. The official deadline for the War Powers Resolution came and went with minor protests and a President flipping them off telling the US that this really isn’t a war, no matter what it looks like. And watch the Progressives line up to defend the Dictator-In-Chief and his Constitutional violations. Of course most of the media tags along with implicit support for whatever Obama the Marxist approves, much like the military and press did in Nazi Germany.

Right now we have a troops in harm’s way in the following conflicts:

• Iraq
• Afghanistan
• Libya
• Pakistan
• Yemen
• Somalia (Corrected from the Sudan – thanks to a commenter.)

And Syria waiting in the wings, with Israel for desert.

It isn’t just that this administration is providing ‘limited’ military intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and tanker support to NATO forces on Libya – although that is what they are claiming. Nope… Since March 31st, we have flown hundreds of strike sorties over Libya and those pesky rumors of boots on the ground are still floating around.

From AirForceTimes:

The White House declined to comment on how 801 strike sorties constitutes “limited” involvement, but Harold Koh, a State Department legal adviser, said in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Tuesday that “when U.S forces engage in a limited military mission, that involves limited exposure for U.S. troops, and limited risk of serious escalation, and employs limited military means, we are not in the kind of hostilities of the kind envisioned by the War Powers Resolution.”
He said there have been “no active exchanges of fire with hostile forces” despite AFRICOM’s statement that weapons had been dropped during 132 sorties.

801 strike sorties? You call that limited? And Koh is a Marxist of the first order, so you just know you can believe him when he says it doesn’t violate the War Powers Resolution – not. Just how long do we, as a nation, allow a rogue President to conduct military actions wherever and however he chooses? Will no one stand up and actually do something in our government? Or are you guys pretty much okay with a dictatorship? Just asking…

And while Obama says all this fuss is just about politics and that he doesn’t know if the War Powers Resolution is constitutional, don’t you think Congress should do their damn job and ensure that Constitution is adhered to? Or is that too much like real work? I guess it doesn’t fit in with their Marxist/elitist plans… And since when is it Obama’s place to decide on the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution or any other law? Seems to me he is saying, “Screw it, I don’t like the law and therefore I don’t have to obey it.” I don’t think we would be given equal consideration if we decided to interpret the law in that fashion, do you?

From CNS News:

“There may be a time in which there was a serious question as to whether the War Powers Resolution was constitutional. I don’t have to get to the question,” Obama said during a White House news conference Wednesday.
“We have engaged in a limited operation to help a lot of people against one of the worst tyrants in the world, somebody who nobody should want to defend. And we should be sending out a unified message to this guy that he should step down and give his people a fair chance to live their lives,” Obama added.

I supported going into Iraq. They were out to hurt the US. I was also for Afghanistan because they were the breeding ground for the Taliban. Now, we cozy up to the Taliban and make deals with them. And in both conflicts (because they were never actually declared wars), we did not let our troops fully do their jobs, which is kill the enemy, break things and come home. Now, I think we should bring them home – because what our government is doing is getting them killed and is setting them up to be slaughtered. They are virtually surrounded by the enemy in the Middle East now and we are playing diplomatic word games. After all, it’s not like our politicians have their asses on the front line, is it?

As for Libya, yep, Moammar Gadhafi is an evil son-of-a-bitch that needs to die. But Libya was not a threat to us. You talk about nation building… Going into a foreign country when it has nothing to do with you and causing a civil war while bombing the crap out of them is war pure and simple. Now we are using drones to bomb in Yemen and the Somalia for the same reasons.

Let me tell you what I believe and you can take it for what it is worth. I believe all of this is to bankrupt the US and bring her to the same level as all the other god-forsaken hellholes on the planet so she will be more easily ‘ruled.’ I believe all of this is to set precedent for attacking Israel while claiming that we aren’t – but you know Israel just wouldn’t play nice and the US could not get involved. Any excuse to see Israel destroyed, so the Middle East can swallow her up and plunge the world into a new dark age. Then onto the Great Satan.

Obama claims he has consulted with Congress over all this. Bull crap. His idea of consulting Congress is telling them how it will be, so shut up and sit down. I ask you, America, when will we find our voices and say that’s enough? The next election is great, but Obama is doing so much damage we may not have that long. If you have the ear of a politician, I suggest you get him or her to stand up and soon, before Responsibility to Protect is brought home to America and implemented. Coming to a border near you.

8 Battlefield Skills That Make Reintegration Challenging

Adapted with permission from James Munroe, Ed.D, VA Boston Healthcare System

Warriors returning home from deployment may experience challenges when reintegrating into civilian life due to survival skills they have developed while living in a combat environment. Below are eight battlefield skills that families can educate themselves about to better understand the common reintegration challenges of returning service members.

1. Safety. Military personnel in the war zone must be on constant alert for danger. Everyday events at home, like a traffic jam, can trigger a sense of danger and vulnerability. The service member may seek constant control and vigilance or attempt to avoid these situations altogether. Those accustomed to living in a safe and secure environment may find these attitudes and behaviors difficult to understand.
2. Trust and Identifying the Enemy. To survive, military personnel must learn quickly not to automatically trust in the war zone. It’s better to assume that everyone is the enemy until proven otherwise. At home, mistrust and suspiciousness can severely damage the most important relationships, including marriage.
3. Mission Orientation. The primary task in the military is to complete the mission ordered from above. All attention and resources are directed to its completion. In the civilian world, individuals are expected to take initiative, seek out tasks, balance competing priorities and decide for themselves how to proceed.
4. Decision Making. In the war zone, following orders is critical to personal safety, the well-being of comrades and the success of the mission. Military personnel whose rank requires decision making must give life-and-death orders, even when all the information is not available. At home, especially in families, decision making tends to be cooperative. People take time to consider questions and options and to seek out additional information.
5. Response Tactics. In the war zone, survival depends on automatic response to danger. It is critical to act first — with maximum firepower — and think later. Keeping all supplies and equipment, including weapons, clean, well-maintained and in their proper place is critical to response. At home, messy rooms and dirty dishes can feel dangerous, and the service member’s response to these realities may appear as an over-reaction and can intimidate or even frighten family members.
6. Predictability and Intelligence Control. In the war zone, troops are in serious danger if the enemy can predict their movements, routine, location or intentions. Military personnel learn to vary their routine and withhold information. But at home in a civilian environment, employers expect routines and children need them.
7. Emotional Control. Combat exposes military personnel to overwhelming events that elicit fear, loss and grief. Yet the job requires that they move on quickly, staying alert and vigilant. The range of acceptable emotions may narrow to anger and numbness. Drugs and alcohol help sustain emotional numbing, even after the service member comes home. Emotions that are dangerous in combat are critical for relationships at home.
8. Talking about the War. It’s hard to talk about how the war changed the individual. War may challenge the service member’s core beliefs about humanity and justice in the world. There are few opportunities to reflect on this in the combat situation. At home, it is difficult to explain to civilians — to people who live in safety — what happened in combat, what decisions were made, why those decisions where necessary. Talking about the war may overwhelm the service member with horror or grief. And service members may be afraid that their stories will upset people they care about or lead to rejection.

Obama's Afghanistan Plan and the Realities of Withdrawal

Obama's Afghanistan Plan and the Realities of Withdrawal is republished with permission of STRATFOR.

By Nathan Hughes
U.S. President Barack Obama announced June 22 that the long process of drawing down forces in Afghanistan would begin on schedule in July. Though the initial phase of the drawdown appears limited, minimizing the tactical and operational impact on the ground in the immediate future, the United States and its allies are now beginning the inevitable process of removing their forces from Afghanistan. This will entail the risk of greater Taliban battlefield successes.

The Logistical Challenge

Afghanistan, a landlocked country in the heart of Central Asia, is one of the most isolated places on Earth. This isolation has posed huge logistical challenges for the United States. Hundreds of shipping containers and fuel trucks must enter the country every day from Pakistan and from the north to sustain the nearly 150,000 U.S. and allied forces stationed in Afghanistan, about half the total number of Afghan security forces. Supplying a single gallon of gasoline in Afghanistan reportedly costs the U.S. military an average of $400, while sustaining a single U.S. soldier runs around $1 million a year (by contrast, sustaining an Afghan soldier costs about $12,000 a year).
These forces appear considerably lighter than those in Iraq because Afghanistan’s rough terrain often demands dismounted foot patrols. Heavy main battle tanks and self-propelled howitzers are thus few and far between, though not entirely absent. Afghanistan even required a new, lighter and more agile version of the hulking mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicle known as the M-ATV (for “all-terrain vehicle”).
Based solely on the activity on the ground in Afghanistan today, one would think the United States and its allies were preparing for a permanent presence, not the imminent beginning of a long-scheduled drawdown (a perception the United States and its allies have in some cases used to their advantage to reach political arrangements with locals). A 3,500-meter (11,500-foot) all-weather concrete and asphalt runway and an air traffic control tower were completed this February at Camp Leatherneck and Camp Bastion in Helmand province. Another more than 2,700-meter runway was finished at Shindand Air Field in Herat province last December.

(click here to enlarge image)

Meanwhile, a so-called iron mountain of spare parts needed to maintain vehicles and aircraft, construction and engineering equipment, generators, ammunition and other supplies — even innumerable pallets of bottled water — has slowly been built up to sustain day-to-day military operations. There are fewer troops in Afghanistan than the nearly 170,000 in Iraq at the peak of operations and considerably lighter tonnage in terms of armored vehicles. But short of a hasty and rapid withdrawal reminiscent of the chaotic American exit from Saigon in 1975 (which no one currently foresees in Afghanistan), the logistical challenge of withdrawing from Afghanistan — at whatever pace — is perhaps even more daunting than the drawdown in Iraq. The complexity of having nearly 50 allies with troops in country will complicate this process.

Read more: Obama's Afghanistan Plan and the Realities of Withdrawal | STRATFOR

Drones and the CIA: Can we wage a global war without troops or allies?

From  Slate Magazine

By William Saletan

Leon Panetta, left, and Gen. David PetraeusIn the decade since Sept. 11, 2001, the United States has developed an air force of drones to fight its new enemies. Faced with terrorists willing to take any life, we built machines that hunt and kill but don't bleed.

In the next decade, our reliance on drones and the spies who support them may increase for a different reason: We're losing friends.

Since Sept. 11, the U.S. drone fleet has grown from a few dozen to 7,000. The Air Force now trains more pilots to operate drones than to fly bombers or fighter jets. Spy drones have flown extensively in Afghanistan and Iraq, where we've fought ground wars. But killer drones have been particularly useful in Pakistan, where we can't send troops.

Every time U.S. ground forces have entered its territory—most recently in the raid that killed Osama Bin Laden—Pakistan has freaked out. But Pakistani leaders have tolerated U.S. drone strikes that killed nearly 2,000 insurgents in the country's frontier provinces over the past five years. In fact, since the Bin Laden raid, the drone strikes have escalated and spread.

Drones and the CIA: Can we wage a global war without troops or allies?

30,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan home by summer 2012: Obama

30,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan home by summer 2012: Obama

Obama to Move US Closer to Leaving Afghanistan

WASHINGTON -- President Obama will move the United States a step closer to ending the war in Afghanistan when he announces plans Wednesday to bring thousands of American troops home, beginning next month.

Administration officials said the president was still in the final phase of a decision-making process that has focused not only on how many troops will come home in July, but also on a broader withdrawal blueprint designed to put the U.S. on a path toward giving Afghans control of their security by 2014.

Obama was given a range of options for the withdrawal last week by Gen. David Petraeus, the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan. The military favors a gradual reduction in troops but other advisers are advocating a significant decrease in the coming months.

While the president has said he favors a significant withdrawal, his advisers have not quantified that statement.

Obama is expected to make Wednesday's announcement in Washington. On Thursday, he will visit troops at Fort Drum, the upstate New York military base that is home to the 10th Mountain Division, one of the most frequently deployed divisions to Afghanistan and Iraq.

Full story...

Obama's World War III Plans for Middle East - Alex Jones Show