Whose Embassy Is This?

cubaconfidential

by Chris Simmons

The Cubans try to control the new American compound in Havana

By THE WASHINGTON TIMES [OPINION]

Barack Obama’s romance with the Castro brothers is rapidly turning into a sour shack-up. That’s what happens sometimes to romances under a tropic moon and the rustle of the coconut palms. Cuba wants to redefine the sanctity of embassies, and how they function. The public still doesn’t know what concessions the president is making to keep a flame under the romance, but it doesn’t sound good for our side.

The State Department has asked for another $6 million to expand the “American interests section,” in all but diplomatic protocol the U.S. diplomatic mission in Havana. Legally and officially, the American Interests Section is part of the Swiss Embassy, but it’s staffed by American diplomats and housed in the old American Embassy in a large building facing the Jose Marti Anti-Imperialist Plaza, which was cobbled together to “embarrass” the Americans.

John D. Feeley, a diplomat with the usual mouthful of title, “the principal deputy assistant secretary of state” in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, asked in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for the money. Unless he told the senators more in private than he did in the public forum, it’s not clear what the money will be used for.

However, Mr. Feeley said some startling things about the big romance. American negotiators are still arguing about whether the security officers at the embassy are to be those of the Cuban secret police, and whether the U.S. can take its own electronic security equipment to expand the mission.

Whether American criminals who have taken refugee in Havana would be returned has not been determined, either. Within 48 hours of the announcement by the Obama administration that it would restore full relations with Havana, several Cuban dissidents were arrested, and are likely to remained imprisoned for an unknown period of time. The question of what the United States will get from reopened relations is not clear. What is clear is that the Cubans get a new center for Cuban infiltration, subversion and espionage in Washington.

WT OPINION continues here:  Embassy Confusion?

U.S. Removes Dead Cubans, Sunken Ships From Sanctions List

cubaconfidential

By Daniel Trotta and Anna Yukhananov

Havana/Washington

(Reuters) - The United States removed 45 companies and individuals from a Cuba sanctions blacklist on Tuesday, most of them dead people, defunct companies or sunken ships.

www.aguadadepasajeros

Among them was Amado Padron, a Cuban executed by a firing squad 26 years ago along with Arnaldo Ochoa, a decorated army general who was sentenced to death by Cuba's communist government after he was found to be connected to international drug trafficking.

The U.S. Treasury Department said the delisting was aimed at clearing "out-of-date" names from its list of Specially Designated Nationals.

Washington bans those designated from trading with U.S. individuals or companies, who face heavy fines if caught doing business with them.

The Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) removed six people, 28 companies and 11 vessels from the list as part of an ongoing review of older cases. Four of the people are dead and two were delisted because the companies they were affiliated with were dissolved, officials said.

The ships had either sunk or were otherwise not operational.

"While these removals are not related to the recent changes to our Cuba sanctions program and rather reflect OFAC's consistent effort to review and update its SDN list, these delistings are in line with the President's Cuba policy," OFAC said.

President Barack Obama rewrote longstanding Cuba policy in December, agreeing with Cuban President Raul Castro to restore diplomatic relations and seek to end more than five decades of animosity between the old Cold War rivals.

Obama has since eased the U.S. trade embargo by allowing some financial transactions and sales of computer technology and construction materials to Cuba while permitting importers to buy from Cuban independent contractors.

The Specially Designated Nationals list adds another level of sanctions, banning transactions even in fields cleared by Obama.

Feature continues here:  OFAC Update 

Expelled Spy Likely To Led Migration, Normalization Talks With US

cubaconfidential

Josefina Vidal thrown out of the US in May 2003 for espionage

By Chris Simmons

The next round of US-Cuban discussions will be held on January 21 and 22 in Havana. Deputy Assistant Secretary Alex Lee is expected to lead the U.S. delegation at the migration talks on the 21st, while Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson will lead at the normalization talks on Jan. 22nd.

The Cuban delegation is expected to be led by Josefina Vidal, director of the North American Affairs Division within Cuba's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Vidal led the previous round of migration talks last July in Washington, D.C. A member of the Communist Party of Cuba’s Central Committee, Vidal was thrown out of the US in May 2003 as part of a mass expulsion of Havana’s spy-diplomats. For five years, her office also played a central role in the negotiations regarding the return of USAID contractor Alan Gross

El caza espias Simmons sobre la inteligencia cubana en EEUU y el enigma de Sarraff Trujillo

Maria Elvira Salazar 

Café Fuerte

Por Miguel Fernández Díaz

El paradero aún desconocido de Rolando “Roly” Sarraff Trujillo fuerza a sospechar que se procedió a inflarlo para compensar un tanto el canje desigual del contratista estadounidense Alan Gross por los tres espías penitentes de la Red Avispa, que a su vez aflora como pretexto para que la administración Obama emprendiera la rectificación de errores y tendencias negativas en la política de Estados Unifos hacia Cuba.

Obama soltó que el canje había incluido a “uno de los agentes de inteligencia más importantes de Estados Unidos en Cuba”, quien proveyó la información conducente al arresto de los miembros de la Red Avispa y otros espías. El vocero de la Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia, Brian P. Hale, precisó que esos otros eran la analista del Pentágono, Ana Belén Montes, y los esposos Myers.

Sin embargo, el valor de cambio de Saraff Trujillo, de 51 años, se consideró despreciable desde que el canje de prisioneros se columbró hacia 2001 con el juicio a “Los Cinco”. Todavía en enero del 2009, al solicitar al Tribunal Supremo la anulación de las sentencias dictadas en el trámite de apelación, los abogados de “Los Cinco” tenían cifradas esperanzas en el canje, tras proponer al gobernante Raúl Castro, en diciembre del 2008, hacerlo con los 75 disidentes encarcelados.

La apelación ante la máxima instancia judicial coindidó con una exhortación de Raúl Castro para canjear los cinco espías por los opositores políticos encarcelados durante la ola represiva de la primavera del 2003.

Mercancía revalorada

En un artículo publicado en El Nuevo Herald el 26 de enero del 2009, el abogado Paul McKenna, quien representaba por entonces a Gerardo Hernández, condenado a dos cadenas perpetuas, le dijo al periodista Wilfredo Cancio Isla que la propuesta de canje no debía desestimarse. “No soy político ni quiero participar en asuntos políticos, pero sería ingenuo decir que [el canje] no es una opción posible. No sería la primera vez que hay intercambios de prisioneros, hay precedentes durante la Guerra Fría”, declaró McKenna.

Las cartas estaban sobre la mesa. Durante una visita a Brasil, en diciembre del 2008, Raúl Castro había lanzado la propuesta a Estados Unidos de hacer “un gesto de ambas partes” y canjear “con familia y todo” a los 75 por los Cinco.

Washington respondió tajantemente que no y ni por asomo hubo contrapropuesta de canje por espías suyos presos en Cuba.

Además de Sarraff Trujillo, arrestado en septiembre de 1995 y condenado a 25 años, cumplían entonces sanciones por espionaje los oficiales del MININT Claro Alonso Hernández, Ernesto Borges Pérez, Amado Medel Martín y Máximo Omar Ruiz Matoses. El cambio habría sido cinco por cinco. El artículo de Cancio Isla es el primero donde aparece mencionado Sarraff Trujillo como una opción de canje, mucho antes de que se produjera el arresto de Gross, pero una investigación reciente de los Herald sobre el tema no reparó en el detalle.

Entonces Cuba enfiló hacía otro objetivo de mayor valor de cambio. En diciembre del 2009, Raúl Castro tuvo que echar mano a Alan Gross para presionar a Washington con un ciudadano estadounidense tan desconectado de la realidad cubana que se creyó podía instalar alegremente dispositivos de telecomunicaciones sin enredarse con la Seguridad del Estado.

Tras casi 20 años en la cárcel y a más de una década del juicio a “Los Cinco”, el valor de cambio de Saraff Trujillo debió ser aun más bajo, pero subió de repente para trompetearse en el canje que ni siquiera incluyó los valores agregados de otros espías encarcelados en la isla, aunque cabe suponer que aparezcan ahora entre las demás personas excarceladas en virtud de decisión unilateral y por las cuales, según Raúl Castro, Estados Unidos “había mostrado interés”.

¿Inflación o justo precio?

El teniente coronel (retirado) de la inteligencia militar de Estados Unidos, Christopher Simmons, asevera que Sarraff Trujillo infomó a la CIA de cómo los agentes de Castro transmitían mensajes cifrados en alta frecuencia y qué deficiencias podían ser aprovechadas para descifrarlos. A poco de ser arrestado Sarraff Trujillo, el FBI pudo descifrar ya las comunicaciones de la inteligencia cubana.

No encaja para nada que la judicatura militar cubana dejara con vida a Saraff Trujillo a sabiendas de que había dado a la CIA información tan comprometedora. Por intentar infructuosamente pasar a la CIA datos sobre agentes infiltrados y las operaciones Baraguá y Sahara, el capitán Ernesto Borges Pérez fue condenado a 30 años el 14 de enero de 1999. Todo parece indicar que la Seguridad del Estado nunca supo hasta dónde había llegado la traición de Saraff Trujillo.

El criptólogo José Cohen, capitán de la Dirección de Inteligencia (DI), desertó en 1994 y el 13 de enero de 2001 declaró al St. Petersburg Times que la Red Avispa fue desarticulada porque el FBI atinó a “descifrar los códigos de comunicación”, algo tan improbable como ganarse tres veces la lotería.

Cohen nunca se ha presentado como parte de la solución al problema del cifrado ni mucho menos como parte de la labor de espionaje atribuida a Saraff Trujillo, a quien reconoce tan sólo como compañero de estudios preuniversitarios y estudioso de José Martí, sin que esta relación de amistad traspasara jamás las líneas marcadas por la regla de compartimentación del trabajo en la DI.

El caso Montes

Por el contrario, Simmons narra que Cohen recurrió al teniente Sarraf Trujillo, asignado al Departamento M-XV (Comunicaciones) de la DI, para conseguir información clasificada y pasarla a la CIA con vistas a desertar. Ambos caerían bajo el radar de la contrainteligencia cubana por la mano suelta de Cohen con el dinero que la CIA pagaba por la información. Cohen advirtió la vigilancia, pidió a la CIA exfiltrarlos y terminó escapando en 1994, pero Sarraff Trujillo acabó siendo detenido. Habría logrado preservar la vida porque sus padres, Odesa Trujillo y Rolando Sarraff Elías, eran altos oficiales de la DI.

Por el hilo de los códigos descifrados se saca el ovillo de los “otros espías” que mencionó Obama. Tales códigos se aplicaron a transmisiones en onda corta que la Agencia de Seguridad Nacional (NSA, por sus siglas en inglés) venía grabando de antes y así el FBI comenzó a perfilar quiénes serían los agentes de Castro.

La investigación de un “sujeto no identificado” [UNSUB] con acceso a informes de inteligencia sobre Cuba se estancó por tres años, pero en agosto del 2000 se dio parte a la inteligencia militar estadounidense y en tres semanas el equipo formado por Scott Carmichael, Karl James, John Kavanagh y el propio Simmons logró identificar a UNSUB: Ana Belén Montes.

Más demoraron en convencer al FBI, que vino a registrar el apartamento de Montes hacia mayo del 2001. Aquí dieron con una latop Toshiba y disquetes que permitieron al agente especial Stephen McCoy concluir: “El estilo de trabajo y comunicación de Montes con la inteligencia cubana corresponde al mismo patrón de comportamiento [de la] Red Avispa”.

Otro superespía en juego

El misterio en torno a Sarraff Trujillo concitó también que saliera al ruedo Bill Gaede, ingeniero informático de origen argentino que dio pie al Congreso de Estados Unidos para dictar la Ley de Espionaje Industrial (1996), como consecuencia de haber aprovechado Gaede su empleo (1979-92) en la empresa estadounidenses Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) para dar información a Cuba, así como su empleo (1992-94) en Intel Corporation (INTEL) para vender información a China e Irán.

Gaede sostiene haber formado con Sarraff Trujillo, Cohen y su esposa, la capitana Lázara Brito, una célula de espionaje [PR-2], que a través del mismo Gaede pasó información clasificada a la CIA desde junio de 1991 hasta abril de 1994, aunque sin guardar relación alguna con transmisiones de mensajes cifrados por radio.

En calidad de oficial del Departamento M-VI (Ciencia y Tecnología) de la DI, Cohen se encargó de atender a Gaede durante sus visitas Cuba y en una de ellas, hacia junio de 1992, le presentó a Sarraf Trujillo, quien habría revelado trabajar en intercepción de teléfonos y otras labores de escucha. Gaede venía ya renegando del comunismo y para el 13 de julio de 1992 estaba en Langley con información suministrada por PR-2, pero la CIA no se tragó que aquel trío de oficiales de la DI fueran desertores genuinos e instaron a Gaede a darles pita.

Gaede dice haber recibido explicación de Cohen por carta sobre la caída de Sarraff Trujillo: “Fue condenado en Cuba simplemente por haber estudiado conmigo y haber sido amigo mío, sin que pudieran probarle jamás absolutamente nada”. La acusación oficial =Causa 45/1996 del Tribunal Militar Territorial de Occidente= reza: Espionaje, Revelación de secretos concernientes a la Seguridad del Estado, Otros actos contra la Seguridad del Estado y Apropiación indebida.

Asimismo, Gaede plantea la hipótesis conspirativa de que Cohen y su esposa trabajaban para Castro y engañaron tanto a él, Gaede, como a Sarraf Trujillo, quien vino en el mismo avión con Alan Gross, pero no podía someterse al escrutinio de la prensa porque no tenía cómo responder a las preguntas sobre los atributos de superespía con que Obama se atrevió a adornarlo.

De este modo Sarraff Trujillo no acaba de aparecer y las preguntas amenazan con escalar hasta el nuevo Congreso instalado en Washington con mayoría republicana. ¿Quién es este espía y por qué resultaba realmente tan valioso para Estados Unidos? ¿A qué se debe la larga espera para conocer de sus servicios a la nación americana?

Tal vez el silencio de Sarraff no se debe a estar sometido a debriefing de la CIA sobre lo que sabe o hizo, sino más bien a briefing sobre lo que tiene que decir si alguna vez reaparece bajo luz pública.

Former Cuban Spy & Conspiracy Theorist Bill Gaede Offers His Interpretation of US-Cuba Spy Swap

cubaconfidential

by Chris Simmons

Bill Gaede/
www.youtube.com

Rolando Sarraff Trujillo

By Bill Gaede

Spy vs. Spy

The recent spy swap between the United States and Cuba puts an end to 50 years of wrangling between the two countries. Washington finally decided to smoke the peace pipe with the Castros, kiss and make up. Conservatives and anti-Castro groups are outraged, and that's an understatement. They see it as capitulation after over 50 years of cold war with the little squirt down south.

As a token of good faith, the U.S. released the remaining three Cuban Five prisoners and Cuba paid back in kind by releasing communications spy Alan Gross. The deal also included a mysterious Cuban national who President Obama credited with helping expose Cuban spies such as the Cuban Five, Ana Belen Montes, and Kendall and Gwen Myers.

However, unlike Alan Gross who took the spotlight and gave a press conference, this agent, who came on the same plane that landed at Andrews Air Force Base near Washington D.C., was whisked away secretly to an undisclosed location. His name was 'leaked' to the press by an anonymous intelligence official of the United States and the story of why the spy is so important and why he was included in the swap was read off a carefully worded text by Brian P. Hale, an expert with an extensive career in dealing with the media. Everyone from the NY Times to the LA Times quickly picked up on the story quoting these sources and each other. The entire frenzy is actually a study in how information is manipulated in the U.S. and how popular opinion is formed.

To help the Obama Administration make its case, Raul Castro, the president of Cuba also remained silent on the mysterious spy that Fidel's Revolution coughed up. The U.S. and Cuba may not agree on much, but here they had to cooperate, and that was one of the things that obviously was negotiated between the two sides: the U.S. would handle the public relations aspect of the swap and Castro would remain silent. Cuba had nothing to lose by putting their three heroes on TV shaking hands with Raul Castro any more than President Obama had anything to lose by putting Alan Gross on camera. None of these agents had to be 'debriefed' or checked by the doctors before appearing in front of the cameras.

The only reason people strongly suspected that the mysterious spy might be Rolando Sarraff Trujillo (a.k.a. Roly) is that his family can't find him. Cuban prison officials told them that their son had been transferred, but not to worry about him. He was in 'good hands'. Certainly, Roly fit most of the description made by Obama at his press conference announcing reestablishment of relations with Cuba: a Cuban intelligence officer locked up for 20 years for providing cryptographic information that led to the capture of the aforementioned spies. So who else could it be? And if in addition the Obama Administration 'carelessly leaks' the name through 'unidentified official' sources, we have the makings of what appears to be 'disinformation'.

Ramblings continue here:  Bill Gaede

Editor’s Note: Cuba recruited Guillermo “Bill” Gaede in the mid-1980s to steal information on computer software and provide it to case officers in Mexico.  Havana, in turn, passed the information to the USSR and East Germany until the end of the Cold War. Gaede, an Argentine communist and software engineer, worked for Advanced Micro Devices, Incorporated in Sunnyvale, California from 1979-1993.  He provided Cuba with AMD specs, designs, “Blue Books,” masks, wafers, and small measuring devices. He claimed his initial motivation was his belief in communism, but this motivation waned after he repeatedly traveled to Cuba and became disillusioned. He left AMD in 1993 because of mistaken fears that the company would soon detect his misconduct. Intel then hired him and greed became his motivator. He began committing espionage for China and Iran, which paid him handsomely.

On a personal note, analysis of Bill Gaede’s current and previous writings found numerous errors, based in part on his flawed interpretation of facts and a predisposition to see conspiracies everywhere.

Art Exhibit By Convicted Cuban Spy Attracts 1300 Spectators During Six-Month Tour of Greece

cubaconfidential

By Chris Simmons

Militant/Georges Mehrabian

By George Mehrabian, The Militant

ATHENS, Greece — About 300 people viewed watercolors by Antonio Guerrero, one of the Cuban Five, at the Oct. 2-5 annual Syriza youth festival, a major political and cultural event here attended by several thousand people. Syriza (Coalition of the Radical Left), a social-democratic coalition founded in 2004, is today the largest opposition bloc in the Greek parliament. On display was a collection of 15 watercolors by Guerrero titled “I Will Die the Way I’ve Lived” that depict the experiences of the five revolutionaries during their first 17 months in the “hole” at the Federal Detention Center in Miami. The exhibit was part of a Cuban booth set up in the festival’s International Corner, which was dedicated to Palestine, Venezuela and Cuba. Showings of Guerrero’s art in Greece have been organized by a joint effort of the José Martí Cultural Association, Greek Solidarity Network-La Red Solid@ria, Hasta La Victoria Siempre and the publishing house Diethnes Vima. “The Syriza youth festival was the 10th stop since the Greece tour was launched in May,” said Loukia Konstantinou, who helped organize the showing. More than 1,300 people have seen the exhibit, some 550 of whom have signed petitions demanding President Barack Obama release the three revolutionaries who remain in prison — Gerardo Hernández, Ramón Labañino and Guerrero. Participants at Guerrero’s 15-watercolor exhibit in Greece have bought a total of 159 books published by Diethnes Vima and Pathfinder Press on the Cuban Five, the Cuban Revolution and other working-class politics.

Raúl Castro propuso a Obama un ‘canal de comunicación secreto’

cubaconfidential

By Chris Simmons

By Nora Gámez Torres, ngameztorres@elnuevoherald.com

La administración del presidente Barack Obama utilizó al embajador español Miguel Ángel Moratinos en el 2009 para hacer llegar un mensaje a Raúl Castro y pedir una acción que reciprocara su decisión de eliminar, tras llegar a la Casa Blanca, las restricciones a los viajes de los cubanoamericanos.

En el libro Back Channel to Cuba, The Hidden History of Negotiations between Washington and Havana, Peter Kornbluh y William LeoGrande reproducen el mensaje enviado a Castro: “Diga a la autoridades cubanas que entendemos que las cosas no pueden cambiar de la noche a la mañana, pero que a lo largo del camino, cuando miremos atrás, deberá quedar claro que este fue el momento en que las cosas comenzaron a cambiar”.

Raúl Castro envió de vuelta una propuesta de abrir un “canal de comunicación secreto”, pero la Casa Blanca replicó que cualquier conversación debía entablarse a través de los “canales establecidos”.

Los autores del libro, que recoge la historia de las negociaciones secretas entre Cuba y Estados Unidos en los últimos 55 años, señalan que aunque Obama ha reconocido que una política hostil es fútil, no ha tenido más voluntad que sus predecesores en romper este impasse. Las razones quizá están en las “lecciones” que los autores resumen casi al final del texto: “Estados Unidos se ha contentado con vivir en un ‘antagonismo perpetuo’ hacia Cuba porque los costos han sido relativamente bajos, y cambiar la política supone riesgos políticos domésticos que los sucesivos presidentes han juzgado como muy grandes”.

Pero Kornbluh aseguró a el Nuevo Herald que las “lecciones” tienen que ver con lo que ha sucedido en los últimos 55 años, y no con el contexto actual.

“La política doméstica sí es un gran impedimento desde el fin de la Guerra Fría pero hay cosas que están cambiando en términos de la opinión pública en Miami y Florida”, en parte como resultado de la propia política de Obama de permitir viajar más libremente a los cubanoamericanos a Cuba, señaló.

Otro factor mencionado por el autor es que Obama es un presidente demócrata en su segundo mandato, por lo que no está tan preocupado por las repercusiones de un cambio de política.

“Florida claramente no está siendo considerada por Hillary Clinton como un estado con un voto decisivo y ella ha hecho pública su posición de que el embargo es una mala idea para la política exterior estadounidense. Estados Unidos tiene también imperativos regionales para cambiar su política. Mira por ejemplo lo que ha pasado con la Cumbre de las Américas, en la que es Estados Unidos el que está aislado y no Cuba”, agregó.

Read more here: Back Channel

Oh How The Mighty Have Fallen; Cuban 5 Protest in Havana Draws…………Thousands

cubaconfidential

Cuban 5 Rally

By Chris Simmons

Telesur English reported a protest in Havana earlier this week drew “thousands” demanding the release of the three remaining Wasp Network spies serving prison sentences in the United States. The demonstrators (largely students) rallied under the marketing savvy theme, “I am Cuba.” The dismal protest followed Havana’s disappointing hemispheric call for Cuban 5 support, which was answered by just 32 Latin American parliamentarians from 14 nations.

It wasn’t so long ago that the Castro regime could produce a carefully-choreographed “spontaneous” protest of 100,000 people in an hour. Now it’s a struggle to get a few thousand demonstrators to show support for one of Havana’s major propaganda themes. Another sign of the slow, steady decline of the government’s influence…...

See the original story here: Telesur

Former DGI Officer Details The Life & Times of Senior Cuban Spy Alexis Frutos Weeden

cubaconfidential

By Chris Simmons

Alexis Frutos Weeden (Courtesy: cafefuerte.com)

Former Dirección General De Inteligencia (DGI) officer Enrique García Diaz reports Alexis Frutos was selected for the DGI during his final year of high school. He then moved to Havana in 1976 to start his spy career. He married an Afro-Cuban woman who gave birth to two daughters during the 1980s. She was not a DGI official at that time.

During the years of the Reagan administration, the “Mexico Desk” at DGI headquarters had eight officers. Frutos Weeden was one of the best officers on this portfolio. Fellow “Desk Officers” included Yolanda Pascual, Enrique Vilavoy "Henry," Luis Popa "Alan," Pablo Avelino Gonzalez Diaz "Avelino," Blas Andres Perira Luna "Ritz," Orlando Fundora Jr "Aldo" and chief of Mexico operations -- Rolando Sarraf Elias "Elias."

According to the CIA Directory of Cuban officials, Sarraf served as a Prensa Latina (PRELA) representative at the Cuban Embassy in the late 1970s. García Diaz and the CIA both noted Frutos Weeden’s assignment to Mexico City as the Commercial Attaché in the early-mid 1980s.

García Diaz said as of his 1989 defection, the DGI Centro in Mexico had 15 officers and had deeply penetrated the Mexican government, every major political party and all key societal sectors. He believes the (now) Directorate of Intelligence (DI) remains deeply rooted throughout the nation to this day.

Alexis Frutos is currently the Political Counselor at the Cuba Embassy in Venezuela, where García Diaz suspects he serves as the DI Centro Chief.

FBI: Cuban Intelligence Aggressively Recruiting Leftist American Academics as Spies, Influence Agents

cubaconfidential

By Chris Simmons

Bill Gertz is a national security columnist for The Washington Times and senior editor at The Washington Free Beacon

Sexual entrapment a common tactic

By Bill Gertz, Washington Free Beacon

Cuba’s communist-led intelligence services are aggressively recruiting leftist American academics and university professors as spies and influence agents, according to an internal FBI report published this week.

Cuban intelligence services “have perfected the work of placing agents, that includes aggressively targeting U.S. universities under the assumption that a percentage of students will eventually move on to positions within the U.S. government that can provide access to information of use to the [Cuban intelligence service],” the five-page unclassified FBI report says. It notes that the Cubans “devote a significant amount of resources to targeting and exploiting U.S. academia.”

“Academia has been and remains a key target of foreign intelligence services, including the [Cuban intelligence service],” the report concludes.

One recruitment method used by the Cubans is to appeal to American leftists’ ideology. “For instance, someone who is allied with communist or leftist ideology may assist the [Cuban intelligence service] because of his/her personal beliefs,” the FBI report, dated Sept. 2, said.

Others are offered lucrative business deals in Cuba in a future post-U.S. embargo environment, and are treated to extravagant, all-expense paid visits to the island.

Coercive tactics used by the Cubans include exploiting personal weaknesses and sexual entrapment, usually during visits to Cuba.

The Cubans “will actively exploit visitors to the island” and U.S. academics are targeted by a special department of the spy agency.

“This department is supported by all of the counterintelligence resources the government of Cuba can marshal on the island,” the report said. “Intelligence officers will come into contact with the academic travelers. They will stay in the same accommodations and participate in the activities arranged for the travelers. This clearly provides an opportunity to identify targets.”

In addition to collecting information and secrets, Cuban spies employ “influence operations,” the FBI said.

“The objective of these activities can range from portraying a specific image, usually positive, to attempting to sway policymakers into particular courses of action,” the report said.

Additionally, Cuban intelligence seeks to plant disinformation or propaganda through its influence agents, and can task recruits to actively disseminate the data. Once recruited, many of the agents are directed to entering fields that will provide greater information access in the future, mainly within the U.S. government and intelligence community.

Article continues here:  Cuban Targeting 

Former DGI Officer Identifies 17 Castro Spies

cubaconfidential

By Chris Simmons

DGI officer and Ambassador, René Ceballo Prats

Cubans Involved In Peru-Based Espionage Operations During The 1970s & 1980s

By Chris Simmons

General Juan Velasco Alvarado came to power as part of a junta that overthrew the Peruvian government in October 1968. In July 1973, Velasco’s leftist government established diplomatic relations with Cuba. A declassified Cuban government cable later identified the General as one of its intelligence agents. Velasco remained in power until late August 1975 when he was deposed by General Francisco Morales Bermudez, his prime minister.

Former Dirección General De Inteligencia (DGI) officer Enrique García Diaz served on the “Peru Desk” at DGI headquarters during this period. During an interview, he explained that three other officers also worked the “desk:” Eulalia Sardain (codenamed "Mayra"), René Ceballo Prats ("Ibrahim") and Ismael Cruz Arce ("Jose Luis"). Two additional DGI officers who worked with García Diaz on Peru issues were Juan Pedro Gonzalez ("Giraldo") and Jose Francisco Molina Mauri ("Ivan").

According to media reports, René Ceballo Prats later led Cuba’s Embassy in Nicaragua as chargé d’affaires starting in 2009. He now serves as Cuban Ambassador to Lebanon.

The CIA’s 1983 global directory of Cuban officials provides the names and positions of 21 Cubans posted to Havana’s Embassy in Peru.  In a review of these personnel, García Diaz identified the following nine diplomats as Cuban intelligence officers or collaborators.

Counselor Jorge Pollo Garcia (“Osvaldo”). DGI Centro chief. According to Garcia Diaz, Pollo’s espionage career began in 1961 with the Illegal Department. Pollo reportedly served briefly in Japan in 1970 before his reassignment to Chile as the Deputy Centro Chief. Following his subsequent tour in Peru, Pollo became chief of the Southern Cone “desk,” overseeing this region’s spy operations. Several years later, he led the upgrade of Cuban intelligence operations in India from a one-man “pointe” to a full-blown Centro. He may have later served in Bolivia before becoming chief of staff for Jorge Valdés-Saldaña Risquet, a member of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party. Media reports later cited Pollo as a Cuban diplomat in Guatemala in the early 2000s.

Consul General Ricardo Cruz Fernandez. DGI.

1^st Secretary Maria Consuelo Ramiriz de Martinez. DGI.

Attaché Angel Moriaga Diaz. DGI Code Clerk.

Commercial Attaché Fidel Diez Tornes. García Diaz characterized this former colleague as the best DGI Case Officer (i.e., spy handler) in Peru.

Prensa Latina (PRELA) Correspondent Ruban Alayon Sanchez (“Lorenzo”). DGI.

Prensa Latina (PRELA) Correspondent Gustavo Carballosa (“Gaston”). DGI. According to García Diaz, Carballosa wrote the daily intelligence report for the Peruvian President.

Prensa Latina (PRELA) Correspondent Manuel Robles Sosa. America Department (DA). Europa Publications’ South America, Central America, and the Caribbean 2003 listed him as the PRELA representative in La Paz, Bolivia. Subsequent PRELA coverage seems to show him active at least through late September 2012.

Prensa Latina (PRELA) Correspondent Gerardo Torres. DGI Collaborator.

García Diaz recalled three additional intelligence officers not on the CIA list. They were:

• Manuel Martinez Galan (“Manolo”), the husband of Maria Consuelo Ramiriz. García Diaz cited Martinez as the first DGI Centro Chief in Lima.
• Eduardo Torres Ravelo. DGI. Open source publications referenced Torres Ravelo as a Cuban diplomat in Chile during the Allende years.
• Prensa Latina (PRELA) Correspondent Sergio Medina (“Sergito”). DGI. García Diaz noted that Medina also served in Colombia at one point. The CIA’s 1983 roster listed Medina as one of several PRELA correspondents in Venezuela.

Enrique García Diaz defected in March 1989 while based in Ecuador. According to a March 2, 1994 feature by the Canadian Press (news agency), García Diaz had served with the DGI since 1978, handling Cuban agents in Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia. (Note: The Canadian Press article is available via Lexis/Nexis).

An intelligence-affiliated “diplomat” – understandably not identified by García Diaz because he served outside the Ministry of the Interior (MININT) – would be the Cuban Military Attaché, Colonel Manuel Bravo Yanez. While not every military attaché is a Case Officer (i.e., spy-handler), they are – at a minimum – overt intelligence collectors reporting to the Ministry of the Armed Forces (MINFAR).

Author’s Note: Given my knowledge of Mr. García Diaz, I have no reason to doubt the reliability of his information on this topic. In addition:

• The status of DGI code clerk Angel Moriaga Diaz was confirmed by another highly reliable former DGI officer.

• Declassified US government reports substantiated the DGI service of Luis Ismael Cruz Arce. This officer first served at the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City around August 1966 before being transferred to the one-diplomat Consulate in Tampico by 1970.

• A declassified CIA report from Oct 17, 1969 identified Manuel Martinez Galan as a DGI officer. Author Jonathan Haslam also characterized Martinez as DGI, attributing his information to a London-based Cuban defector. In contrast, in 1972, internationally known newspaper columnist Jack Anderson identified Martinez, then a 1^st Secretary in Santiago, as head of the DA’s Chile-based operations. A decade later, the CIA listed Martinez as a 1^st Secretary at the Cuban Embassy in Moscow.

Latell’s Latest Assessment Reveals Why Analysts Should Not Perform Counterintelligence

cubaconfidential

by Chris Simmons

Ana Belen Montes

Writing first in the Cuba Transition Project and then the Miami Herald, Dr Brian Latell recently energized readers with his feature, New revelations about Cuban spy Ana Montes. 

I, however, was greatly disappointed with the article. To start, he sensationalized several trivial issues and recycled old news stories (yes, she was a “true believer”  volunteer and yes, she was brought to the Cubans by talent-spotting agent Marta Rita Velazquez). None of this information is new.

However, he then misinterprets several key facts due to a lack of understanding regarding the field of counterintelligence, in layman’s terms – spy-catching.

For example, Latell claims that Montes met with her handlers “initially in New York, and later at her request in the Washington area…” Any Counterintelligence officer knows Havana would never consider running a penetration of the US government from 225 miles away. Having an agent or officer travel that distance once or twice a month for an extended period would be a huge risk to the security of the operation. Montes may have “asked” the Cubans for a DC-based spy handler, but the reality is she was going to be transferred to a local operative regardless of her wants and wishes.

More dangerous (and out of context) is his claim that during her interrogations, she was told that investigators “had information from a senior official in the Cuban intelligence service concerning a Cuban penetration agent that implicated Montes.” While that may be - in part - what the Pentagon document said, rare are the instances wherein an interrogator would truthfully tell a suspect they were betrayed by a colleague. That said, it is a common ploy to lie to a suspect and tell him/her their own people gave them up. This is what occurred with Montes.

Another major error is his wildly speculative and erroneous statement: “Did she work with other American spies? The report is ambiguous; it states that after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 pressure intensified to arrest Montes. The FBI preferred to wait, however, in order “to monitor Montes’s activities with the prospect that she may have eventually led the FBI to others in the Cuban spy network.”

The FBI wasn’t the only organization that preferred to wait – those of us in the Defense Intelligence Agency wanted to continue building the case as well. The “others in the Cuban spy network” weren’t part of some mysterious massive spy ring, but rather the compañeros she'd served during her espionage career.

Dr Latell is an exceptional analyst in his field. That said, Counterintelligence is a discipline unto itself, rendering any analytic generalist a poor job fit for analyzing spy services. Counterintelligence analysis is – and will always be -- best performed by badge-carrying Special Agents skilled in investigations, operations, and collections.

Internet Foils Disinformation Operation Regarding Funeral For Mother of Alan Gross

cubaconfidential

By Chris Simmons

Cuba’s once world-class propaganda operations suffered another self-inflicted blow late yesterday, this time by expelled Spy Josefina Vidal, who continues to serve undercover as director of the US Division within Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Vidal issued a press release claiming Havana is unable to award Gross a humanitarian visa for the funeral because “…neither the Cuban penitentiary system nor the US penitentiary system provide the possibility for inmates to travel abroad, no matter the reason…”

Before crafting this poorly conceived propaganda piece, Mrs. Vidal and her DI brethren should have searched the internet, where they would have found this Associated Press story on convicted Wasp Network spy Rene Gonzalez from April 12, 2013:  Judge approves Cuban spy visit home.

Is it really possible that the DI can’t even pull off a simple disinformation mission anymore without tripping over itself? Unbelievable! Ironically, readers will also note that the AP story is proudly displayed on the website by the National Committee to Free the Five.

Miami Herald Continues Use of Source Previously Tied to Cuban Intelligence

cubaconfidential
By Chris Simmons

The Miami Herald’s never-ending love affair with regime-affiliated personnel continues this weekend, with Juan Tamayo’s citing of Marifeli Perez-Stable in his article,U.S. academics say Cuban reforms not going well. While Tamayo also cited numerous legitimate experts, he failed to acknowledge Perez-Stable’s past affiliation with Cuban Intelligence, which can be found here: Media Use Suspected Spies as Expert Sources  and here, Marifeli Perez-Stable

Colaboracionistas y agentes del regimen castrista se reunen en Miami

que colaboracionistas del regimen dirigidos por agentes de la inteligencia castristas radicados oportunamente en los eeuu, realicen un evento propagandistico siguiendo la agenda que trazan en la habana y lo enmascaren como una conferencia de organizaciones no gubernamentales partidarios de la unilateral normalizacion de las relaciones cuba-eeuu, es simplemente aprovechar la libertad de expresion y de asociacion negada y reprimida brutalmente en cuba, para cabildear y generar y/o modificar estados de opinion sobre el asunto, puede ser considerado "valido" en el sentido democratico. lo que resulta incongruente es que ninguna de las organizaciones anticastristas del exilio y sus portavoces, hayan hecho acto de presencia en la actividad o al menos les tiraran una trompetilla desde la acera de enfrente. todo demasiado politicamente correcto para ser tenido como meritorio.
o al menos que le exijan a la plaza de la revolucion a traves de  los colaboracionistas y agentes de influencia, que un evento similar se realice en la habana, para que los partidarios de mantener las restricciones viertan sus argumentos referidos a las condiciones que debiera cumplir el regimen en la practica. como ello no seria aceptado pues este tipo de convite solo esta reservado para los 55 Hermanos   y los "respetuosos" contemporaneos, las reclamaciones del evento miamense serian descartadas por la ley del 3ro excluido. 

mas abajo el reconocido caza espias  Chris Simmons, se refiere a la composicion de los cabecillas del evento y al aseptico tratamiento que merecio en los medios miamenses.

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Yesterday’s Herald featured the innocent sounding article, Supporters of Stronger US Relations With Cuba Stage Rare Gathering in Miami. The author, longtime Cuba-watcher Juan Tamayo, wrote “A rare conference of supporters of normalizing U.S.-Cuba relations heard calls Saturday for the Obama administration to allow more travel to the island and remove it from a list of supporters of terrorism.”

The career journalist noted that over 100 people attended the one-day event that offered panelists such as “Arturo Lopez-Levy, a Cuban foreign policy expert at the University of Denver, and Antonio Zamora, a Miami lawyer and member of the Brigade 2506 that invaded Cuba in 1961. He now favors normalizing bilateral relations.”

Conference promoter Hugo Cancio, however, lamented that Washington denied a visa to “invited panelist, retired Havana diplomat Jesus Arboleya, and denied permission to attend the conference to two Cuban diplomats in Washington - First Secretary Juan Lamigueiro and General Counsel Llanio Gonzalez.” Tamayo also spoke with Collin Laverty, a U.S. citizen who works with U.S. visitors to the island, who told him about 90 percent of Americans visiting Cuba are funneled through the Cuban government’s Havanatour agency. (Note: The actual name is Havanatur).

Alarmingly, you could fill volumes with all the intelligence service connections the Herald conveniently omitted. A few of these key facts would include:
• Arturo Lopez-Levy - in his own book – admitted to having been a spy with Cuba’s Ministry of the Interior (MININT). Likewise, the Herald failed to note the seven-year PhD candidate’s close family ties to Raul Castro’s son-in-law, MININT Col. Luis Alberto Rodriguez Lopez-Callejas.

• The banned panelist, Colonel Jesus Arboleya Cervera was identified by intelligence service defector Jesus Perez Mendez in 1983. Years later, Arboleya’s intelligence service was further corroborated by convicted spy Carlos Alvarez.

Arboleya served as a Second Secretary at the Cuban Mission to the United Nations in New York City before transferring to the Washington-based Cuban Interests Section. During his US tour, Arboleya was the architect of the 1970’s US-Cuba normalization drive, which almost succeeded in 1977 following the formation of a group of prominent Cuban-Americans who called themselves the Committee of 75. Although headed by respectable Cuban-Americans, including two clerics and several businessmen, the Committee was inspired by the DGI, (then) Cuba’s primary foreign intelligence service. According to Senate testimony of March 12, 1982, at the time, Arboleya may have been the longest serving DGI officer in the United States.

• The Havanatur office in Miami surveilled Cuban-Americans seeking to visit the island and recruited agents from among them, according to 1981 Congressional testimony. Subsequently, the US Treasury Department identified Havanatur and CIMEX (among others) as Cuban front companies. In the intelligence arena, a “Front Company” is any entity created, controlled, or heavily influenced by a spy service to fulfill espionage missions without its actions being attributed to the host intelligence service.

In March 2004, the US Treasury identified Havanatur as a CIMEX subsidiary. Public records reveal CIMEX’s involvement in everything from weapons purchases for leftist guerillas in the 1980s to more genteel import/export endeavors.

Havanatur, as well as the remainder of Cuba’s tourism sector, is run as a joint venture by the Ministry of the Interior (MININT) and the Ministry of the Armed Forces (MINFAR). For almost 20 years, credible defectors and émigrés have reported that part of the earnings from tourism are channeled back into the operating budgets of these two agencies. As a result, US tourists are actively funding Cuban repression and espionage.

• The entry point for the much heralded “people-to-people” tours is the Cuban Institute for Friendship with the Peoples (ICAP). DGI officer Jesus Raul Perez Mendez was the ICAP director before his defection. So well known is ICAP’s collaboration that in 1983, the New York Times cited a State Department spokesman who said ICAP was suspected of having an intelligence collection mission in support of the DGI.

More recently, former DI officer Juan Manuel Reyes-Alonso reportedly that ICAP is not a DI entity per se, but that it was overwhelmingly influenced by the intelligence service. He further claimed ICAP was penetrated by a small cadre of bona fide DI officers, aided by a large staff of agents (i.e., collaborators). As a result, roughly 90% of ICAP was thought to be DI-affiliated.

So the question of the day remains: why is the Miami Herald so adamant about ignoring, suppressing, minimizing or discrediting news on Havana’s spy services?