Cuba destinara 5.6 billones al Club de París

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El gobierno de Raúl Castro destinará 5600 millones de dólares al servicio de su deuda con el foro 19 de países desarrollados con el que hasta 2011 mantenía una deuda activa de 13.914 millones, según la Oficina Nacional de Estadística cubana. "Vamos a cerrar la reconciliación dentro de pocas semanas, y meses más tarde tendremos una negociación", confirmó el presidente del Club de París y jefe del Tesoro francés, Bruno Bézard.

"Hemos avanzado rápido. Por la parte de Cuba y por la parte de los acreedores existe una voluntad de llevar a cabo este trabajo", agregó Bézard, quien estuvo en La Habana hace unos días con el equipo del gobierno francés, que prepara la visita del presidente François Hollande, el 11 de mayo.

El tema de la deuda estará en la agenda de lo que será la primera visita de un presidente galo a la isla, y no se descarta algún arreglo de condonación de parte de las obligaciones de la isla, como han hecho en los últimos años Rusia, Japón y México.
Cuba suspendió el servicio de la deuda con el Club en 1987 alegando "injerencia" de algunos de sus acreedores en la política interna de la isla comunista. Un año antes, había renegociado favorablemente sus adeudos de 1982-86. En 2001 La Habana propuso al Club una nueva renegociación sobre una "solución razonable", pero fracasó ante las "condiciones totalmente inaceptables", exigidas por los acreedores, según el Banco Central de Cuba.
Esa parte de su deuda, que Cuba considera "inmovilizada", asciende a 7.983 millones de dólares y sería el centro de las negociaciones, pues el resto corresponde fundamentalmente a deuda comercial.

Analiza el Club de París deuda de Cuba

Reuters/

El jefe del Club de París de naciones acreedoras se reunió el viernes con funcionarios de finanzas de Cuba, en lo que catalogó como una visita oficial sin precedentes a La Habana para discutir la deuda de la isla de Gobierno comunista.

Después de que las conversaciones se habían estancado en el 2000, los acreedores y Cuba han actuado con rapidez durante el pasado año en las negociaciones sobre una deuda total que el presidente del Club de París, Bruno Bezard, estima entre 15.000 millones de dólares y 16.000 millones de dólares, y donde Francia es el mayor entre los 15 acreedores.

Bezard, quien es también director general del Tesoro francés, dijo que creía que su visita es la primera que hace a Cuba un líder del Club de París.

Las dos partes están en el proceso llamado de reconciliación para determinar exactamente la cantidad de la deuda y los intereses que Cuba debe a cada acreedor, un requisito previo para las negociaciones reales.

"Hemos avanzado rápido. Por la parte de Cuba y por la parte de los acreedores existe una voluntad de llevar a cabo este trabajo", dijo Bezard en una conferencia de prensa en La Habana.

"Vamos a cerrar la reconciliación dentro de unas pocas semanas, y después de algunas semanas o meses más tarde tendremos una negociación", agregó.

Cualquier acuerdo con el Club de París reduciría significativamente la deuda de Cuba, mejoraría su reputación en los mercados financieros y permitiría que se emita una nueva deuda.

Hace aproximadamente un año, Cuba y el Club de París reanudaron las conversaciones, en una señal de que el gobierno comunista estaba interesado en insertarse en la economía global y seguir las reglas de las finanzas internacionales.

Esas conversaciones se pusieron en marcha, mientras que, a espaldas de la mayoría del mundo, Cuba también participó en negociaciones secretas con Estados Unidos para restablecer las relaciones diplomáticas.

El Club de París es un grupo informal de 19 países acreedores: Australia, Austria, Bélgica, Gran Bretaña, Canadá, Dinamarca, Finlandia, Francia, Alemania, Irlanda, Italia, Japón, Países Bajos, Noruega, Rusia, España, Suecia, Suiza y Estados Unidos.

Cuba may revive Paris Club debt negotiations

chicagotribune.com

HAVANA (Reuters) - Cuba and the Paris Club of wealthy creditor nations are working to resume talks over billions of dollars of official debt in a new sign the communist government is interested in rejoining the global economy.

A Paris Club delegation quietly traveled to Havana late last year to meet with Cuban bank officials, who were prepared with various proposals and appeared eager to strike a deal, according to Western diplomats.

Previous negotiations broke off in 2000 and obstacles remain to reviving serious talks, said the diplomats, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly.

They said Cuba must first show creditors its books, which so far it has refused to do. Cuba considers its level of foreign reserves a state secret and publishes scant data on its current account and foreign debt, which it last revealed for 2010.

Still, the diplomats have taken Cuba's readiness to talk as an indication it may be willing to play by the rules of international finance.

Although it is still a long way off, any deal with the Paris Club would significantly reduce Cuba's debt, improve its reputation in financial markets and allow it to issue new debt.

In the latest of President Raul Castro's market-oriented reforms, Cuba recently approved a foreign investment law that it hopes will bring in billions of dollars.

It has also embarked on a monetary reform that would eliminate its two-currency system, another hindrance to foreign investment, and it is about to begin talks with the European Union on forming a new bilateral relationship.

"The positive is that Cuba has more or less been restructuring and meeting its debt obligations for the last three years. The negative is that they think that is enough and do not understand that we must know their financial capacity to live up to whatever agreement we might come to," one diplomat said.

In the past three years, Cuba has restructured its debt with China, Japanese commercial creditors, Mexico and Russia, each time obtaining substantial reductions in what it owed in exchange for payment plans it can meet.

The Paris Club is an informal group of 19 creditor nations: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States.

The club has a special working group on Cuba that excludes the United States and it may be willing to waive the usual prerequisite of an International Monetary Fund agreement and be creative in looking for solutions, the diplomats said.

DEBT SWAPS CONSIDERED

During last year's meeting in Havana, Cuba expressed an interest in having a percentage of the debt forgiven, paying another percentage over 10 years, and swapping the remainder for an equity stake in Cuban state enterprises, the diplomats said.

"If you look at new foreign investment incentives put into place this year, some sort of debt swap appears more possible," one said.

The Cuban government last reported its "active" foreign debt, accumulated after it declared a default in the late 1980s, as $13.6 billion in 2010. The government no longer reports its "passive" debt from before the default, which economists estimate at $8 billion.

By the Paris Club's accounting, Cuba owed its members $35.5 billion at the close of 2012, but more than $20 billion of the debt was in old transferable Soviet rubles, 90 percent of which Russia forgave in 2013.

Cuba considers the Paris Club figures inflated, meaning one point of the talks would be to settle on how much is owed.

The Paris Club figure excludes late interest and service charges, nor does it consider debt to private creditors and countries such as China, Brazil and Venezuela.

For Cuba to agree to any deal it would need a significant percentage of its debt forgiven, said Richard Feinberg, a non-resident senior fellow of the Washington-based Brookings Institution and the author of several studies on Cuba's need to join the international financial community.

"In addition, there's the tough issue of non-transparency. For the Paris Club creditors to have some confidence in repayment capacity, they would need to know more about Cuba's present and projected balance of payments, including current reserves," Feinberg said.

"Normally, all of these issues are sorted out by the IMF, which facilitates the whole deal with a package of liquidity. Of course Cuba is not a member and I don't see any other candidate willing or able to act as an IMF proxy," Feinberg said.

Castro, who replaced his ailing brother Fidel in 2008, has drastically reined in imports and cut state payrolls and subsidies while insisting the government improve its finances.

In 2011, the Communist Party approved a five-year economic plan to enhance Cuba's international credibility by strictly observing its commitments, expediting the rescheduling of Cuba's foreign debts and implementing "flexible restructuring strategies" for debt repayment.

(Reporting by Marc Frank; Editing by Daniel Trotta and Kieran Murray)

¿Cuántos millones de dólares debe Cuba a la Argentina?

Taringa!

Una impresionante cantidad de dinero, especialmente para la época y en un momento en que el mismo no le sobraba a la Argentina, fue prestada al Gobierno de Cuba, en el año 1973, en condiciones muy confusas en cuanto a la modalidad aplicada, tanto que hasta algunos estudiosos del tema han manifestado que las cifras podrían ser mucho más altas que las denunciadas por el entonces Ministro de Economía, JOSÉ BER GELBARD, quien siendo un fervoroso simpatizante del castrismo, se hizo cargo personalmente del caso.

Lo único seguro es que fueron en total - hubo varias entregas-, algunos miles de millones de dólares, pero sin dejar de considerar, otra vez, lo que esa cifra representa a la fecha.

Un intento de actualización de la deuda de Cuba a la Argentina, rescatable por la seriedad de la fuente, la hizo en el año 2009, el Economista argentino ORLANDO FERRERES, quien la fijó por entonces en 11.000 millones de dólares, aclarando que no podría asegurar la precisión de dicha actualización. Si esta respondiese a la realidad, ya nomás, por el pasaje de cinco años, debería haber trepado a una cifra mucho más importante todavía.

Nunca el kirchnerismo se ocupó del tema, ni siquiera en los peores momentos de la Economía de sus Gobiernos, cuando ese dinero hubiese representado la solución a tantos problemas que siguen vigentes, por la excusa, precisamente, de que no había recursos.

Ese es un caso, el que el próximo Gobierno, sea cual fuere su signo, deberá investigar y resolver, como hecho de justicia, para todos los argentinos.

El otro es el de la deuda con Venezuela, sobre la que, curiosamente o no, también hay imprecisión. Y es que cómo no la iba a haber cuando los dineros llegaban a la Argentina, permanentemente y de modo secreto. No habrá que olvidar que el famoso descubrimiento que involucró al venezolano ANTONINI WILSON, fue absolutamente casual y puntual. Por entonces, lo único que se encontró fueron casi 800.000 dólares, de una cifra bastante superior, que solamente comprendió ese puntual vuelo. Por entonces abundaron las informaciones que hablaban de que el sistema aplicado para que HUGO CHÁVEZ les enviara dinero a los KIRCHNER, utilizaba frecuentemente esa modalidad que hacía que los aviones ingresaban a la Argentina a través de lugares especiales, deliberadamente no controlados, es decir, por “zonas liberadas”.

Hay una referencia cercana en el tiempo, que habla de la posible cifra que se le debe a Venezuela, y fue mencionada por el opositor venezolano HENRIQUE CAPRILES, quien la estimó en 12.000 millones de dólares, en una entrevista exclusiva que al venezolano le hizo el Diario argentino CLARÍN, el 22 de Diciembre último.

Deuda que razonablemente podría ser mucho mayor, si se considera el sistema tan cerrado y secreto con que se movían los Presidentes de ambos países, la Argentina y Venezuela. Situación que se prolongó por varios años, dando oportunidad entonces, a que los operativos de entrega de dinero fueran muchísimos. Claro está que HUGO CHÁVEZ no sólo enviaba petrodólares a Buenos Aires, sino que también lo habría hecho a Bolivia y presumiblemente a Nicaragua, según el contenido de algunas versiones, las que proceden de las mismas fuentes que piden el anonimato, y que aseguran que a los KIRCHNER les llegaban siempre cantidades más altas que a cualquier otro destinatario del Gobierno de CHÁVEZ, en razón de que a éste le interesaba especialmente que la Argentina no cayera en problemas económicos para así tener un aliado relativamente importante, de pie y firme. Propósito que coincidió siempre con lo pedido por FIDEL CASTRO, sobre nuestro país, y que los KIRCHNER acataban orgullosamente, y lo harían hoy nuevamente con los hermanos CASTRO, aún ausente CHÁVEZ, ya que con ellos CRISTINA KIRCHNER mantiene una fluida y cómplice relación.

Todo un tema para registrar y exigir en el futuro, la debida regularización, tanto en el pago como en el cobro debido.

Cuba's External Debt Problem: Daunting Yet Surmountable

ascecuba

By Luis R. Luis

Cuba has been in default of the bulk of its external financial obligations for over 50 years without negotiations towards a comprehensive restructuring.  Even the facts of the case are difficult to ascertain.  According to the most current official Cuban information published by Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, the external debt stood at $12.3 billion at the end of 2009.  But according to the Club of  Paris of 19 major creditor governments (including Russia and Brazil but excluding China) the claims on Cuba by this group alone at the end of 2011 were $30.5 billion.[i]  Adding claims by private and other official creditors yields total external obligations of $43.1 billion. However, this number does not include capitalized interest due private and some official creditors.  In addition, the estimate does not include debt to Venezuela arising from the bilateral agreement between the two countries through which Cuba receives crude oil and derivates.  There is no precise information on this potential debt, although in recent years reported Cuban exports of health and other services to Venezuela exceed the value of its oil imports.

CUBA: EXTERNAL DEBT BY CREDITOR - US$BILLIONS
	actual	projected
	end 2011	end 2014
BIS banks	1.7	1.2
Paris Club/a	30.5	10.4
Other Official Debt/b	2.0	2.6
Suppliers/c	4.6	5.0
Defaulted Bonds and loans/d	4.3	4.3
Total	43.1	23.5
debt ratios  (on 2011 GDP and trade data)
Debt as % of GDP	62.5	34.0
Debt as % of Exports + Tourism	504	275
Debt as % of Convertible Exports + Tourism	839	458
Debt as % of Exports of Goods and Services	262	143
Sources: BIS, Quarterly Review ( June 2012 and September 2013), Paris Club (Annual Reports
2011 and 2012), Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, Exotix and author's  estimates.
a/ official debt to major creditors except Brazil, China and Venezuela
b/ Brazil, China and other official debt not in Paris Club estimated from project data
c/ estimate based on data from ONE for end 2009
d/ defaulted bonds and commercial loans carried at face value
and includes $1.25 billion from London Club

The table shows external claims on Cuba.  The bulk of this data is reported by creditors, either official or private, or estimated from project finance figures.  Only the debt to suppliers is derived from the Cuban government.  A sizable part of the discrepancy with Cuban statistics stems from the long-standing rejection by Cuba of principal and interest owed to the former Soviet Union and claimed by Russia.  Nonetheless the Club of Paris this year revised upwards by $4.6 billion its claims to $35.1 billion as of the end of 2012, of which some 40% are new claims by Russia of principal and past due interest.[ii] Subsequently Russia announced a preliminary agreement for the writing off and refinancing of $32 billion of Soviet era debt.[iii] The actual agreement was signed in October 2013 and reportedly will write-off 90% of the debt with $3.2 billion to be repaid over 10 years.[iv]  Some of this will be offset by new credits from Russia for the leasing of airplanes and purchases of other equipment.  Implementation is expected to take place by the end of 2014 as the Russian Duma needs to grant approval.

There have been other important recent debt negotiations.  In 2012 an agreement was completed to write-off a substantial amount of Japanese commercial debt and rescheduling the reminder for 30 years.  It is not known if this agreement involved official debt, while there has been no confirmation from the Paris Club.  In September 2013 Mexico announced a restructuring of official claims on Cuba.[v]  Mexico is writing off 70% of a $487 million debt owed BANCOMEXT, the Mexican foreign trade bank.  The table incorporates these restructuring agreements into a forecast for the debt at the end of 2014.

Lacking comprehensive negotiations Cuba is making progress on restructuring important components of its foreign obligations.  On a practical level these agreements can open the door to some bilateral trade and project finance, though they are insufficient to propel Cuba towards access to international financial markets.  For this, restoration of relations with international financial institutions, crucially the IMF and World Bank, are needed followed by agrements with the Paris Club and later, a settlement with bondholders and other long-ago defaulted private creditors. These agreement are required for Cuba to achieve a comprehensive restructuring of its debt and gain market perception of creditworthiness.

How burdensome is Cuba’s external debt?  To help answer this question I have calculated debt ratios shown on the table. These ratios relate the debt to the capacity to service it.  Complementary ratios showing the burden of debt servicing are not calculated as there is scant public data regarding Cuba’s principal repayment schedules, interest rates and bond and loan covenants directing the treatment of past due interest and principal.

The ratio of debt to GDP at the end of 2001 was 62.5%, nearly matching the 61.2% average  of transition economies in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.[vi]  This ratio is surely understated by the accounting of Cuban national accounts at a notional value of CUP 1 =  US$1.  A more realistic exchange rate means a substantially higher value for this indicator.  Following the restructuring operations with Russia and Mexico, the debt to GDP ratio will be lowered to around 34% by end 2014.  For the sake of argument, assuming the Cuban peso is overvalued by 40%, the ratio would be 57%.

A problem, however, is that the Cuban economy is relatively closed to international trade and nearly completely closed to international financial and capital markets.  So that even if the debt is not very large relative to the size of the economy, it would still require a great effort to achieve the capacity to service the debt without great stress on its external accounts, and on consumption and investment.

Looking at the debt in an alternative way,  the ratio of projected 2014 debt to exports of goods and services at 143% would place Cuba among a number of countries with investment grade credit ratings.  Nonetheless, a majority of current account receipts are part of barter trade with Venezuela and other countries such as Brazil, China and Russia which provide a small amount of free cash flow.  Another measure, the ratio of debt to convertible exports and tourism receipts which are paid in cash, places the ratio at over 450%, an unsustainable level that implies a high probability of default.

These numbers depict a situation where debt levels even after some restructuring are still daunting, and where the solution lies in opening up the economy to trade and investment as well as a decisive push to engage in a wider set of external financial negotiations.  These will require a contribution by Cuba to make partial restitution payments on defaulted obligations.  All of this will be arduous as political considerations in Cuba and abroad stand in the way of progress. 

---

[i] Club of Paris, Annual Report, 2011.

[ii] Ibid, Annual Report, 2012.

[iii] Pravda, February 22, 2013

[iv]  “Deal on Forgiving $32 billion Cuban Debt to USSR Signed”, The Moscow Times, 11 December 2013, Issue 5274.

[v] “Mexico Says it will waive most of $487 million debt owed to Cuba”, Reuters, November 1, 2013.

[vi] Luis, L. R., “Cuba: External Debt and Finance in the Context of Limited Reforms,” Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, Annual Proceedings, 2013, forthcoming.

Cuba's External Debt Problem: Daunting Yet Surmountable

ascecuba

By Luis R. Luis

Cuba has been in default of the bulk of its external financial obligations for over 50 years without negotiations towards a comprehensive restructuring.  Even the facts of the case are difficult to ascertain.  According to the most current official Cuban information published by Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, the external debt stood at $12.3 billion at the end of 2009.  But according to the Club of  Paris of 19 major creditor governments (including Russia and Brazil but excluding China) the claims on Cuba by this group alone at the end of 2011 were $30.5 billion.[i]  Adding claims by private and other official creditors yields total external obligations of $43.1 billion. However, this number does not include capitalized interest due private and some official creditors.  In addition, the estimate does not include debt to Venezuela arising from the bilateral agreement between the two countries through which Cuba receives crude oil and derivates.  There is no precise information on this potential debt, although in recent years reported Cuban exports of health and other services to Venezuela exceed the value of its oil imports.

CUBA: EXTERNAL DEBT BY CREDITOR - US$BILLIONS
	actual	projected
	end 2011	end 2014
BIS banks	1.7	1.2
Paris Club/a	30.5	10.4
Other Official Debt/b	2.0	2.6
Suppliers/c	4.6	5.0
Defaulted Bonds and loans/d	4.3	4.3
Total	43.1	23.5
debt ratios  (on 2011 GDP and trade data)
Debt as % of GDP	62.5	34.0
Debt as % of Exports + Tourism	504	275
Debt as % of Convertible Exports + Tourism	839	458
Debt as % of Exports of Goods and Services	262	143
Sources: BIS, Quarterly Review ( June 2012 and September 2013), Paris Club (Annual Reports
2011 and 2012), Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, Exotix and author's  estimates.
a/ official debt to major creditors except Brazil, China and Venezuela
b/ Brazil, China and other official debt not in Paris Club estimated from project data
c/ estimate based on data from ONE for end 2009
d/ defaulted bonds and commercial loans carried at face value
and includes $1.25 billion from London Club

The table shows external claims on Cuba.  The bulk of this data is reported by creditors, either official or private, or estimated from project finance figures.  Only the debt to suppliers is derived from the Cuban government.  A sizable part of the discrepancy with Cuban statistics stems from the long-standing rejection by Cuba of principal and interest owed to the former Soviet Union and claimed by Russia.  Nonetheless the Club of Paris this year revised upwards by $4.6 billion its claims to $35.1 billion as of the end of 2012, of which some 40% are new claims by Russia of principal and past due interest.[ii] Subsequently Russia announced a preliminary agreement for the writing off and refinancing of $32 billion of Soviet era debt.[iii] The actual agreement was signed in October 2013 and reportedly will write-off 90% of the debt with $3.2 billion to be repaid over 10 years.[iv]  Some of this will be offset by new credits from Russia for the leasing of airplanes and purchases of other equipment.  Implementation is expected to take place by the end of 2014 as the Russian Duma needs to grant approval.

There have been other important recent debt negotiations.  In 2012 an agreement was completed to write-off a substantial amount of Japanese commercial debt and rescheduling the reminder for 30 years.  It is not known if this agreement involved official debt, while there has been no confirmation from the Paris Club.  In September 2013 Mexico announced a restructuring of official claims on Cuba.[v]  Mexico is writing off 70% of a $487 million debt owed BANCOMEXT, the Mexican foreign trade bank.  The table incorporates these restructuring agreements into a forecast for the debt at the end of 2014.

Lacking comprehensive negotiations Cuba is making progress on restructuring important components of its foreign obligations.  On a practical level these agreements can open the door to some bilateral trade and project finance, though they are insufficient to propel Cuba towards access to international financial markets.  For this, restoration of relations with international financial institutions, crucially the IMF and World Bank, are needed followed by agrements with the Paris Club and later, a settlement with bondholders and other long-ago defaulted private creditors. These agreement are required for Cuba to achieve a comprehensive restructuring of its debt and gain market perception of creditworthiness.

How burdensome is Cuba’s external debt?  To help answer this question I have calculated debt ratios shown on the table. These ratios relate the debt to the capacity to service it.  Complementary ratios showing the burden of debt servicing are not calculated as there is scant public data regarding Cuba’s principal repayment schedules, interest rates and bond and loan covenants directing the treatment of past due interest and principal.

The ratio of debt to GDP at the end of 2001 was 62.5%, nearly matching the 61.2% average  of transition economies in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.[vi]  This ratio is surely understated by the accounting of Cuban national accounts at a notional value of CUP 1 =  US$1.  A more realistic exchange rate means a substantially higher value for this indicator.  Following the restructuring operations with Russia and Mexico, the debt to GDP ratio will be lowered to around 34% by end 2014.  For the sake of argument, assuming the Cuban peso is overvalued by 40%, the ratio would be 57%.

A problem, however, is that the Cuban economy is relatively closed to international trade and nearly completely closed to international financial and capital markets.  So that even if the debt is not very large relative to the size of the economy, it would still require a great effort to achieve the capacity to service the debt without great stress on its external accounts, and on consumption and investment.

Looking at the debt in an alternative way,  the ratio of projected 2014 debt to exports of goods and services at 143% would place Cuba among a number of countries with investment grade credit ratings.  Nonetheless, a majority of current account receipts are part of barter trade with Venezuela and other countries such as Brazil, China and Russia which provide a small amount of free cash flow.  Another measure, the ratio of debt to convertible exports and tourism receipts which are paid in cash, places the ratio at over 450%, an unsustainable level that implies a high probability of default.

These numbers depict a situation where debt levels even after some restructuring are still daunting, and where the solution lies in opening up the economy to trade and investment as well as a decisive push to engage in a wider set of external financial negotiations.  These will require a contribution by Cuba to make partial restitution payments on defaulted obligations.  All of this will be arduous as political considerations in Cuba and abroad stand in the way of progress. 

---

[i] Club of Paris, Annual Report, 2011.

[ii] Ibid, Annual Report, 2012.

[iii] Pravda, February 22, 2013

[iv]  “Deal on Forgiving $32 billion Cuban Debt to USSR Signed”, The Moscow Times, 11 December 2013, Issue 5274.

[v] “Mexico Says it will waive most of $487 million debt owed to Cuba”, Reuters, November 1, 2013.

[vi] Luis, L. R., “Cuba: External Debt and Finance in the Context of Limited Reforms,” Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, Annual Proceedings, 2013, forthcoming.