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Could Iranian President Hassan Rouhani be another Mikhail Gorbachev -- a real reformer who opens his country’s political system and creates the space for détente with the United States and Europe?
Historical analogies are always fraught, of course, and leaders who are championed as reformers almost always leave disillusionment in their wakes. In addition, the jury is still out on whether a nuclear deal between the United States and Iran, which would open the door for a relaxation of painful sanctions, is even a good idea -- the specifics of the agreement matter greatly.
But whichever side one comes down on, it is worth considering where the Islamic Republic might be headed. In that regard, there are a few areas to watch.
NOTHING LEFT TO LOSE
Gorbachev was unique, a true believer in Soviet renewal who sat at the very top of a profoundly centralized political system.
Rouhani is nothing like him. In fact, Rouhani came to power precisely because of Tehran’s deep fragmentation, particularly within its right-wing establishment. The fracturing created an opening that Rouhani burst through in a surprise electoral victory in June 2013. But it also means that he cannot impose far-reaching reform. No one in Iran could, not even Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. (If anything, the ceaseless invocations of Khamenei’s “supreme” authority testify to its absence, as well as his desire to have it.)
That said, the Iran state structure is similar to that of the former Soviet Union in some respects. Namely, both were born of revolution, which created a theocracy -- in one case with a clerical establishment, in the other with a Communist party -- that overrode the formal institutions of the state, such as parliaments, judiciaries, and civil service. In Iran, as in the Soviet Union in the 1980s, the revolution is aging, with far-reaching consequences. An official ideology, whether Marxism-Leninism or political Islam, can give a regime great power. But it can also destabilize the theocratic system if the populace and the rulers lose faith. And there, Iran is vulnerable.
A second similarity can be found in Iran’s imperial overstretch. It is problematic enough that Iran’s geopolitical ambitions significantly exceed its capabilities. But it is really taxing that the places and causes in which the country has chosen to become enmeshed are so volatile. Soviet leaders would sympathize: as KGB analysts ruefully lamented, mostly after the collapse of the union, the regime’s allies almost always seemed to be impoverished basket cases whose only industry was perpetual civil war. Working with them might have poked the United States in the eye. But it did little for Soviet prestige, economic well-being, and security. From Afghanistan and Angola to Cuba and Yemen, to say nothing of North Korea, hawkish Soviet foreign policy often resembled a very determined stomp on a rake. (Thwack.)
Something similar, on a smaller scale, could be said of Iran's foreign policy. By now, most Americans understand that the intervention in Iraq (the second Iraq War), waged at great cost in American blood and treasure, redounded to Iran’s geopolitical benefit. Many analysts argue that the United States’ failure to intervene militarily in Syria did the same. But it is difficult to pinpoint, precisely, what Iran gained in Iraq or Syria. It is unclear that Iranian regional “successes” improved its security or its citizens’ well-being. One could even argue that Iran’s support for mischief (and worse) has only heightened the regime’s vulnerability -- just like the domestic failures of political Islamism.
Like the Soviet Union, Iran lives in a tough geopolitical neighborhood, one that has only been getting tougher. Statelets concocted by French and British colonial officials, the bankruptcy of pan-Arab nationalism, the recent struggles to the death between hopelessly corrupt authoritarians and the opposition (which is also often authoritarian), some violent de facto partitions -- these have created a regional tangle that inflicts immense suffering and that no outside power can readily unknot.
Simply put, U.S. policy in the Middle East is in shambles because the Middle East is in shambles. Iran’s Middle East policy is in shambles too. Persistently playing the role of spoiler in one’s own neighborhood brings few long-term rewards -- and that is even before the recent round of international sanctions (a stunning achievement made possible by the fact that China and Russia, as much as they chafe at U.S. power, dislike any kind of revisionism other than their own). Thanks to Iran’s behavior, its neighborhood has become still more treacherous, and the pain is multiplied by the country’s international isolation, high inflation, and collapsing currency.
At this point, Iran has little to lose but its own chains if it reforms and cooperates with the West. Of course, that is no guarantee that it will. Just because something is necessary does not mean that it is politically feasible. In fact, Iran’s political establishment is far from ready for a drastic turnabout in relations with the Great Satan. The structures that facilitated the U.S.-Iranian alliance during the Cold War are long gone -- the genuine Soviet menace, the strongman regime installed by a U.S.-sponsored coup, even the intense dependency on foreign oil. At the same time, the U.S. alliance with Israel, Iran’s sworn enemy, has only deepened. Any mini-détente with the United States, which is vital for Iran’s domestic development, is going to require far-reaching domestic changes.
And herein lies Rouhani’s Gorbachev moment.
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